The Metaphysics of a Naturalist 
13 
In an article on ^^Psychological Corollaries of Modern Neurolo- 
gical Discoveries Professor Herrick said that 
“the condition of consciousness is not topographical but consists in the 
form of activity” (p. 155). “It is impossible to discover a specific por- 
tion or a definite kind of matter in which consciousness resides, for no 
complexity of the material unit could make intelligible the diversity in 
consciousness, while any complexity destroys the objective grounds of 
unity. It is equally hard to discover any physiological basis for the 
continuity of consciousness. The idea of consciousness as a property 
is accordingly abandoned and it remains to conceive of it as a form, of 
energy. Pure energy with the attribute of spontaneity it could only be if 
it were in the mode of absolute equilibrium, in which its activities should 
be wholly reflected into themselves. This can only be predicated of infin- 
ite essence and it is necessary to substitute the conditions of relative 
equilibrium in a sphere of interfering activities. The last few years have 
revealed in the cerebrum a mechanism of neural equilibration of unsus- 
pected complexity, and all that we have recently learned of the physiol- 
ogy of the nerve stimulus only emphasizes the belief that the whole of 
the cortical complex is adapted to react as a unit, though not as an invari- 
able unit. The great extent of the system of associational tracts and 
the facility with which new channels of overflow are set up or marked out 
is additional evidence in favor of an equilibrium theory of consciousness. 
. . . . The conditions of consciousness consist in the proper equili- 
brium of stimuli to produce a reflection of the stimuli upon the complex 
of which they form a part. The mechanism of this condition is found 
in the cortical centers, which are in continual action in such a way that 
a vortex of activity is in continual flux— each element contributing to 
the balance of the whole. To this complex, external stimuli are contin- 
ually being admitted, whether as separately unobserved elements from 
the general-sensation apparatus of the common sensorium (giving rise 
simply to the implicate concept of personal existence in space), or more 
specific stimuli through the avenues of the special sense organs. Every 
sense-content with its escort of reflexly-produced associated elements 
causes a more or less profound disturbance of the psychical equilibrium 
and the nature of this disturbance depends not alone on the intensity and 
state of concentration, but very largely on the kind of equilibrium already 
existing The character of the conscious act (and the elements 
of consciousness are always acts), will of course depend upon the extent 
to which the several factors in the associational system participate in the 
equilibiium. Each disturbance of the equilibrium spreads from the 
point of impact in such a way that progressively more of the possible 
reflex currents enter the complex, thus producing the extension from 
mere sensation to the higher processes of apperceptive association. A 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, vol. 7, pp. 155-161 (March, 1898); cf. also 
“The Material Versus the Dynamic Psychology,’’ Psychological Review, vol. 6, 
1899, pp. 180-187. 
