The Metaphysics of a Naturalist 
15 
ness, though this probably should be conceived as a functional 
rather than as an anatomical discontinuity. If a chemical or 
circulatory theory contains the true factor for determining these 
transfers of energy, as seems now more probable, the preceding 
conception will have to be revised to uneet the demands of the 
facts. But that some sort of dynamic interchange takes place at 
this point is made probable by the structure of the nervous 
elements and by many converging lines of evidence, whether the 
nerve cells be conceived as anatomically separate or as forming 
a continuous network as some eminent investigators believe. 
According to the dynamic theory 
the act of consciousness is not the result of an excitation in any 
cell or cells, but is produced by the impinging of an sesthesodic^-"^ upon 
a kinesodic system in reciprocal reaction. The transmission of nervous 
force does not produce a higher force; but the peculiar interference or 
increase of tension of nerve forces in antagonistic equilibrium does. 
Consciousness depends on the dynamic element — a translation of force 
into energy and thus, to us, there seems to be a complete hiatus between 
consciousness and all other phenomena. 
The motor reaction (in at least incipient form) is essential. 
The vast majority of our acts are performed without the aid 
of consciousness. But 
even in cases where the subsidiary cortical current actually passes it 
may awaken no consciousness. This is explained upon a dynamic theory 
of consciousness. The cells are indeed excited by the current but, for 
whatever reason, no interference or kinesodic reaction is produced. 
Only when an antagonistic wave is set up is consciousness possible. 
This does not, however, prevent an unconscious process from awaking 
consciousness afterwards by vestigial action Our judgment 
that part of our acts are unconscious means simply that the same 
sensory state is often combined with different amounts of kinesodic 
activities.^" 
The equilibrium theory of consciousness has to contend with 
a great obstacle in the form of a nearly universal popular fallacy. 
We have grown so accustomed to the necessity of localization of 
See Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology for definition of these 
terms. 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, vol. 5, 1895, p. 212. 
'^''Journal of Compara'ive Neurology, vol. 5, 1895, p. 213-214. 
