26 
C. L. Herrick 
from one body to another is really a transference of the proper- 
ties of the one to the other, for the properties are simply the forces 
resident in the individual. 
Still farther difficulties rise as one proceeds, one of the most 
serious of which grows out of the attempt to reconcile the attri- 
bute of freedom, i, c., the spontaneity of the souhs action, with 
the observation that the form of the soul’s activities seems to be 
conditioned by the external stimuli which affect the nervous 
system. Our text books are filled with endless and usually profit- 
less discussions intended to prove or disprove the freedom of 
the soul to act in any way it choses in view of given inducements. 
The belief that the freedom of the will requires that it should 
be possible for the soul to act at any time in a way determined 
neither by the circumstances of the environment or by the inner 
nature of the soul itself or by any combination or interaction 
of these two elements is entertained only by those who fail to see 
its grotesque absurdity; but the influence of some form of this 
dogma is felt where it would not be explicitly defended. 
The analogy of the conservation of energy also gives trouble, 
for it is plain that if the forces which act on the nervous system 
from without are transformed till they at last produce in the soul 
the sensations, etc., to which a psychical nature is attributed, 
then it seems superfluous to require a separate and superphysical 
cause for the same act. On the other hand, if the external 
stimulus really has no efficiency in the production of the act of 
consciousness, why should the stimulus seem to be a necessary 
prerequisite? Force is lost in either view and this is contrary to 
the dogma of physics. Sometimes the conscious process is called 
an epiphenomenon, i. e., a phenomenon or appearance not the 
result of the action but a shadow-like accompaniment of the 
activity. The difficulty also arises that we unconsciously under- 
mine the freedom of the will in denying the element of real 
energy in the psychical phenomena because it is a matter of every 
day experience that our psychical experiences apparently issue 
in voluntary acts, each of which has its material effect. The 
theory of the reciprocal action between the soul and body, 
in the crude form in which it usually appears, may accordingly 
be set aside for the present while we consider the claims of the 
theory of identity of these two elements. 
The claim is made that there is no real distinction between the 
