THE FUNDAMENTAL POSTULATE OF DYNAMIC 
MONISM 
It was a geniune, if unconscious, insight which dubbed physics, 
oh the one hand, nature philosophy,’^ and philosophy, on the 
other, ^^meta-physics” — an insight which seems to have been to 
some extent lost or obscured as a result of more rigid specialism. 
In last analysis it will be found that the present needs in both 
spheres are identical. What is wanted is a fundamental postu- 
late on which to rear the superstructure in each department. 
It need not surprise us to find that, after all, this superstructure 
is one building of many rooms and that the foundation is the 
same in the two cases. 
Such a fundamental postulate must needs be beyond the limits 
of inductive proof and it can have for its sole credential the cri- 
terion of congruousness. Complete congruousness and applica- 
bility to the conditions of all experience is all that can be de- 
manded. In all branches of philosophy one of the most serious 
drawbacks to a satisfactory construction of the data employed 
is the absence of a common basis of reality — a fundamental 
postulate ontologically acceptable in all connections 
Anyone familiar with modern mathematical physics does not 
need to be reminded that here too the present need is such a 
primary postulate. In philosophy students are monists, dualists, 
etc., but in molecular physics men seem irresistibly driven 
into monism. It is only when we turn from nature to the prob- 
lems of subjective experience that the mind doubts the validity 
of its instinctive craving for unity. In saying this we are not 
unmindful of the fact that metaphysical dualism is strongly 
intrenched in the physical pseudo-dualism of matter-force. Yet, 
however convenient this distinction is, it does not find a place 
in serious modern physical speculation. The reader who has his 
First Principles” well in memory will recall that Spencer 
frankly recognized the futility of all atomistic conceptions (pp. 
51 to 53, et seq.). He is apparently unable to see any recourse 
in the crudely expressed dynamism substituted by Boscovich. 
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