The Metaphysics of a Naturalist 
43 
holiness, love anil mercy are, for the essence of divine manifestation would 
have to be perfect good faith and certainty of action. Due responsi- 
bility could hardly be laid upon mankind as moral beings without the 
conservation of energy, etc. 
This passage from a familiar letter is quoted as showing that it 
is impossible to divorce physics from higher problems. Yet it 
may not be amiss to seek further construction of this immediate 
divine in the atom. Whatever it is, it is also the element of 
final reference in every field of inquiry, as much as in physics. 
That it may and does possess many forms of manifestation is 
obvious; one characterization serves for all. It, if divine, is 
unconditioned^^ — spontaneous. If anyone objects to the use of 
the word divine as ambiguous, the same conclusion is reached if 
we substitute the word absolute. If disposed to cling to a 
homogeneous ether — ^^a pure fluid’’ — its necessary attributes 
are continuity and elasticit}^ Perfect continuity and perfect 
elasticity, however, require two postulates, i. e., unconditioned 
energy and infinity — both attributes of our postulated absolute. 
If the latter attribute be denied, we must ascribe limitations 
to ether, thus conditioning its elasticity and destroying its con- 
tinuity. Objection may be taken to the introduction of the 
spatial idea. We admit its incongruity. We did not introduce 
it ; but, if it be carried to its final issue, it destroys itself. 
iVgain reverting to the necessities of our thought, it is claimed 
that pure spontaneity is the most natural view of phenomena and 
the earliest. The child perceives movement or change. It is 
yet to be shown that he necessarily sets up a predicament of cause. 
Motion is at first an event by itself as much as (and before) an 
object is. Motion is first observed; change is the primary psy- 
chical element and always remains so. It is just as probable 
that the child sets up a predicament of materiality as of cause 
in connection with its earliest experiences. In later life, even, 
our instinctive apprehension of change is of something spontane- 
ous, as when we watch the changing hues of the sunset sky. 
Logical necessities growing out of the permanence of certain relations 
lead us to read cause into experience at a later period. We are 
not denying the validity of cause as a partial concept, but simply 
limit its application. What is now needed is a return to the naVve 
Not externally conditioned. 
