54 
C. L. Herrick 
appearance. This same reality-idea when applied to the acts that 
are recognized as such and are plainly forces rather than objects 
is termed cause. When the reality idea is applied to experiences 
that prominently affect the sense of touch so that the tactile or 
muscular sense-element preponderates, the substance is called 
matter. No doubt the most of us recognize matter in forms of 
experience in which we have not appreciated any tactile element, 
but these are refinements of a sophisticated science. 
One great gain from this form of apprehension of reality is 
found in the removal of a problem which has perplexed thoughtful 
people during the entire past, namely the property of inherence or 
the peculiarity of one real being which enables it to act on another. 
If activities are a single essence and differ only in form, they are 
convertible and thus any form of activity may conceivably be 
transformed into another and the conversion of one mode of 
action into that mode proper to my conscious state is a problem 
of interference or composition of forces, and requires no outside 
element or tertium quid to cause it. A rainbow in the heavens 
is not less a real thing than the mountain beyond it because the 
forces acting in the former case are evanescent and appeal to 
but one of our senses. 
A thing or object is a concept involving, in addition to the 
element of reality, quality or perceived relation and the act of 
predicating on the part of the percipient. An object implies a 
subject who posits it (Lotze). 
At this point is the critical stage in the development of a con- 
gruous theory of nature. Science having primarily to do in the 
early stages of its development with ponderable things, was 
founded on the idea of matter in which the forces with which it 
really deals were supposed to reside as properties. When these 
properties are removed what remains? To this question science is 
and ever must be dumb and makes appeal to philosophy. The 
rash student who ventures to doubt the reality of matter is meta- 
phorically (if not actually) offered the knock-down argument 
of having his head thrust against a wall. This proves the relative 
impenetrability of the wall. But the modern physicist himself 
has questioned the sufficiency of the old position and discovers 
that this property’’ of impenetrability is after all but the resul- 
tant of the composition of a vast multitude of molecular vibra- 
tions or forces of which we are not cognizant in their individual 
