The Meiaphtjsics of a Naturalist 
73 
But could I have chosen otherwise? Yes, but only by violat- 
ing my own conscience and degrading my own character. That 
would, however, have indicated that my character was not 
what I supposed it to be or was not in accord with the ideal self. 
I could not have done otherwise than I did being what I was. 
Thus arise the continual antinomies of the real and ideal self.^^ 
Here we have a reconciliation of the law of determinism and the 
Doctrine of Sin. The old Hebrew idea of sin etymologically 
was that of missing a mark. Sinning is a mistake or failure. 
The concept of self increases faster than the impulses proper to 
its preservation. These impulses grow as character grows; but 
character is always behind a growing ideal, though it may be a 
long way in advance of a diminishing one. 
Conviction of sin is possible only in a growing stage of moral 
life. A failure correctly to estimate the results of a line of con- 
duct may result in our standing aghast at the results of an uncon- 
sidered act, but this does not affect the moral value of the act. 
Remorse is often but the belated realization of results. Such 
feelings are educational in effect and are substituted for in society 
by the punishments which form the sanctions of law. The cul- 
tured man suffers more by remorse than from any punishment, but 
his remorse is not capable of acting as a deterent to others. 
If sinning is a mistake, where is the responsibility? Why was 
the act wrong? Because I now perceive that the act was not 
performed in conformity to the demands of my ideal nature. 
We say that my lower nature prevailed; nevertheless nature, 
since life began, has been building up these very impulses and 
appetites. These are essential to self-preservation. Our clearer 
vision now sees that they are but partial. The ideal self is 
larger, loftier, better. We ought to act in its behest. But, 
alas, it does not possess the strong body-guard of inherited im- 
pulses and requires to be guided by the clearer but colder light 
of reason. 
<0 “Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, in the sense 
that in every given case every action is possible for him and he only recognizes a 
posteriori from experience and reflection upon experience that his actions take place 
with absolute necessity from coincidence of his character with his motives. Hence 
it arises that every uncultured man, following his feeling, defends his freedom in 
particular actions; while the great thinkers of all ages, and, indeed, the more profound 
systems of religion, have denied it.^’ (Schopenhauer, World as Will, Book IV.) 
