TAC 
By this principle it is easy to conceive how 
a ship is compelled to turn in any direction, 
by the force of the wind acting upon her 
sail in horizontal lines. For the sails may 
be so arranged as to receive the current of 
air either directly, or more or less obliquely ; 
hence the motion fcommimicated to the, 
sails must of necessity conspire with tiiat of 
the wind upon their surfaces. To make 
the ship tack, or turn round with her head 
to the windward, it is therefore necessary, 
after she has received the first impression 
from the helm, that the heail-sails should be 
so disposed as to diminish the eftort of the 
wind, in the first instant of her motion, and 
that the whole force of the wind should be 
exerted on the after sails, which, operating 
on the ship’s stem, carries it round like a 
weathercock. But since the action of the 
after sails, to turn the ship, will unavoidably 
cease when her head points to the wind- 
ward, it then becomes necessary to use the 
head-sails to prevent her from falling off, 
and returning to her former situation. 
These arc accordingly laid aback on the 
lee-side, to push the vessel’s fore part 
towards the appointed side, till she has 
fallen into the line of her course thereon, 
and fixed her sails to conform with that 
situation. 
TACKLE, or Tackling, among seamen, 
denotes all the ropes or cordage of a ship, 
used in managing the sails, &c. In a more 
restrained sense, tackles are small ropes 
running in three parts, having at one end a 
pendant and a block; and at the other end, 
a block and hook, to hang goods upon that 
are to be heaved into the ship or out of it. 
See Ship. 
TACTICS, in their general acceptation, 
relate to those evolutions, manoeuvres, and 
positions, which constitute the main spring 
of military and naval finesse : they are the 
means whereby discipline is made to sup- 
port the operations of a campaign, and are, 
in every regular service, studied for the 
purpose of training all the component parts 
according to one regular plan or system; 
whereby celerity, precision, and strength, 
are combined, and the whole rendered com- 
pletely etficient. Of military tactics, the 
Romans may be considered the first nation 
whose military array could be termed regu- 
lar, and whose forces maintained that order, 
which rendered each inferior individual sub- 
ject to the control of certain subaltern 
officers commanding small bodies, corres- 
ponding with our sections ; which being 
again compacted under officers of a second 
TAC 
class, formed small divisions, gs in onr pla- 
toons, OP companies ; and which divisions 
being collected under a third class ot offi- 
cei’s, constituted what we terra battalions. 
The soldiers of ancient Italy were not only 
inured to great hardships, as a part of their 
usual exercise, but were taught many evo- 
lutions suited to the modes of warfare in 
those days. 
Time has occasioned a considerable 
Change in that particular ; for since the in- 
vention of gunpowder, our battle.s have 
frequently been decided by distant can- 
nonades ; and by no means resembled those 
arduous conllicts in which the heroes of old 
used to engage, individually contending for 
the day, and causing the wiinle field to re- 
semble an infinity of single combats. In 
this practice all barbarous nations seem uni- 
formly to agree ; the sword, the tomahawk, 
the club, &c. being the chief instruments ; 
though in some instances the javeline, or 
spear, or the bow and arrow, may be pri- 
marily resorted to. Hence such warfare is 
far more sanguinary than that carried on 
with fire-arms ; which rarely do much exe- 
cution, unless when aided by artillery, and 
then only when at such distances as to be 
within reach of case-shot. It w'ill no doubt 
surprise most of our readers, but is strictly 
true, that, taking the average quantify of 
musket ammunition expended, as a sum to 
be divided by the number of killed and 
wounded, not more than one shot in fifty 
will be found to take effect. Thus, after a 
battalion of 1000 men may have fired 20 
rounds per man, making in all 20,000 dis- 
charges of musketry, they will have made 
terrible havoc if 400 of the enemy be 
disabled. 
Hence we find, that the great features 
in decisive actions are few indeed; and 
they depend chiefljfon tactics. Thus where 
a large force is brought to bear upon any 
particular point, while the enemy is kept 
in ignorance as to the object in view; or 
where certain advantages of locality are 
gained, merely by dint of superior science 
in the art of conducting troops by the 
shortest means, and in the greatest order ; 
or where by certain evolutions a small force 
is made to supply the purpose of a larger, 
or to resist, independently of intrenchments, 
&c. a more numerous body ; all these evince 
the presence of the man of tactics, and qua- 
lify him for the designation of “ an able 
General.” 
We have also another branch, which is in 
a degree secondary, because it depends 
