TACTICS. 
▼antage of being ready either to form a 
flank, by wheeling backwards an octave, 
or to move forward into line ; which can- 
not be* done from a close column without 
deploying. 
When a column is advancing towards an 
enemy, it is proper that its cannon should 
precede it, to clear the way by their fire ; 
but when retreating, the cannon should be 
in the rear, to check pursuit. The passage 
of rivers is generally conducted on the same 
principle ; adverting to one point, where a 
choice can be made ; viz. always to cross at 
a re-entering bend of , -the stream, as shotvn 
in fig. 19, by reference to which it will be 
seen, that in crossing from A to B, tlie pas- 
sage cannot be flanked by the enemy ; while 
it is defended by the troops which first 
cross : change the position, and cross from 
B to A, and the enemy will flank the pas- 
sage, which you cannot defend ; because 
they will enfilade whatever troops or can- 
non you post for that purpose ; they having 
the command of a greater extent of front 
than yourself in the latter instance. 
One of the most arduous situations in 
which an officer can be placed is the cover- 
ing, or conducting, of a convoy ; especially 
when heavy carriages are in question. A 
numerous convoy can rarely travel more 
than six or seven miles within the day, how- 
ever favourable the roads may be ; unless 
it may be practicable to draw two or three 
carriages abreast, which can be practicable 
on plains only ; for whenever a pinch or de- 
file might present itself, so as to occasion 
only one carriage to proceed at a time, 
though only for a few feet, as in passing a 
narrow bridge, it would have the same ef- 
fect as if the whole day’s journey were per- 
formed in single trains : this is not the case 
in chainpain situations, because one column 
of waggons may keep moving on while ano- 
ther is stopt ; and, if a carriage should break 
down, others may pass round it : in this 
way the columns should not be far distant. 
When we consider that a hundred waggons 
will cover a mile in leiiglh, we cannot but 
admire the frequent success of officers, per- 
haps with only four or five battalions under 
their command, in conducting convoys of 
many hundreds of heavy carriages, through 
an exposed country, from one place to an- 
other ; sometimes, indeed, for full an hun- 
dred miles. On such service it is highly 
necessary to have a body of cavalry ; else 
every little party of the enemy’s horse 
would subject the convoy to perpetual dan- 
ger and delay. 
When a general expects a convoy, he 
must favour its approach and safety by 
every possible means : one of the best de- 
vices is, that of threatening an attack ; so 
as to prevent the enemy from detaching his 
cavalry. When the convoy is near, and it 
is suspected that an attempt will be made 
to cut it off by a sudden movement, the ge- 
neral must, if circumstances admit, make 
one retrograd_e march with his whole force 
to meet it ; or, if that be not practicable, 
he may send orders for it to follow such 
route as may be most under cover, or best 
removed from the danger of assault. We 
often see instances of a campaign being de- 
cided by the safe arrival, or vice versa^ by 
the loss of, a convoy. The utmost skill 
sometimes cannot oppose the overbearing 
prowess of superior power ; but, as we al- 
ways suppose an army to place itself be- 
tween its expected supplies and the enemy, 
it is evident, that if of equal forc^, every 
advantage is on its side ; for the enemy, 
having a greater distance to inarch, when 
about to attack a convoy, than the de- 
fenders have to proceed to its rescue, and 
any detached party being liable to destruc- 
tion while passing round the flank, it is evi- 
dent, that by retaining the intermediate si- 
tuation, we may generally afford every ne- 
cessary protection. When it happens other- 
wise, we commonly find, that the enemy 
are superior in cavalry, which they detach 
to a great distance to intercept the convoy, 
while their infantry remains in some strong 
position. In such case a retreat is indis- 
pensably necessary, and reliance must be 
placed in the commander of the convoy, (if 
he is warned of the enemy’s approach) be- 
ing able either to take refuge under the 
walls of some fortified place ; or, on his 
taking possession of some village, or form- 
ing a barrier against the enemy, by drawing 
up his waggons, &c. to the best advantage : 
in such case he is virtually entrenched ; his 
cattle and troops being within an area im- 
penetrable to cavalry, and furnishing an ex- 
cellent cover for the keeping up a most de- 
structive fire on the assailants. If he can 
command a supply of water, he may do 
wonders ; at all events, he may easily hold 
out until relieved. 
A retreat, well managed, is usually more 
favourable than a dear earned victory. To 
insure the means of retreating, without con- 
siderable loss, a second, or even a third, 
line may be requisite : at all events, a re- 
serve of select troops, with a good park of 
artiUery, chiefly supplied with grape and 
