•I 
TACTICS. 
case-sliot, will be indispensable. Tlic post- 
ing a reserve requires great judgment, both 
in regard to the enemy’s designs, and the 
temper of your own troops. 
, The celebrated retreat of Moreau, 
through the Black Forest, placed him, ipso 
facto, on a footing with the greatest con- 
querors of the day ; it tore from his oppo- 
nent’s brows those laurels which tlie latter 
claimed, in consequence of having urged 
the French general to quit the open coun- 
try. In that instance, however, it may, 
perhaps, be said, and not without some 
show of Justice, that the nature of the coun- 
try was greatly in favour of the latter ; but, 
on the other hand, it must be taken into 
account, tliat, unless most skilfully managed, 
a retreat before a very superior force must 
have been peculiarly dangerous, especially 
to the cavalry : we may, indeed, admire 
that system of tactics, which enabled Mo- 
reau to save his artillery and baggage. To 
do this, it is evident he must have shown a 
firm front, so arranged, that his opponent 
dared not to venture an attack. The ex- 
cellence of the manoeuvre consisted in the 
deceptions practised ; for it was not until 
that movement, when Moreau had secured 
his baggage and artillery, and, as it were, 
buried his army among the wildernesses, 
that the Austrian general could believe it 
possible for the French to escape being 
captured. Tlie device used, was a feint to 
escape along the skirts of the forest, which 
occasioned a change of position in the Aus- 
strian camp, and left Moreau at liberty to 
push in the opposite direction towards a 
pass, scarcely, indeed, passable for car- 
riages, and thus to defy pursuit; however 
it answered his purpose, for he escaped 
with his whole army. 
We cannot close this article withotit 
showing how essentially a well chosen posi- 
tion contributes to success. Where an ar- 
my is weak in cavalry, it should invariably 
be parted so that, at least, one of its flanks 
may be covered from the enemy’s horse. 
By this means, if its own cavalry be held 
in reserve, or nearly so, but with full 
powers to support the open wing, the 
enemy must be kept in suspense, as to the 
point to which it will direct its charge ; and 
be compelled, in many instances, to keep 
his horse divided, for the purpose of op- 
poyiig that charge on either flank. A flank 
may be securely covered by a town, duly 
defended by infantry ; or by a river ; a mo- 
rass ; a fhi( k wood : a steep hill, having a 
battery duly posted ; or even by broken 
ground. , In some instances, a slight in. 
trcnchment may be necessary. 
Tactics, mml, relate to those opera- 
tions in the management of a vessel, which 
enable her to attain any particular object, 
such as reaching a port, avoiding danger, 
gaining an advantage over an enemy, &c. 
In a more extended sense, they denote 
those manoeuvres, stratagems, and decep- 
tions, employed by the commander of a 
fleet, for the purpose of gaining a weather- 
gage, cutting off any part of a line, or 
attacking any particular portion thereof, in 
such manner as may either defeat the views 
of a hostile fleet, or subject it to loss and 
discomfiture. The old system of tactics in 
this, as well as in the military branch, was 
burthened with ceremonies, and with re- 
ceived opinions, which were held to be in- 
violable : the difference of one or two ships 
in favour of the enemy, was considered a 
sufficient excuse for a variety of precau- 
tions generally amounting to forbearance 
from engaging the superior power; and, 
although we certainly can count a number 
of gallant exploits performed by our fleets 
when somewhat interior to the enemy, it 
has been reserved for latter times to exhibit 
what could be done by the British navy, 
even when opposed to nearly double their 
own force. This wonderful change was in- 
troduced by Rodney; who, in the year 1782, 
engaged the French fleet under Count de 
Grasse ; when by boldly cutting off a part 
of its rear, he compelled nearly half the 
enemy’s force to surrender ; the rest sought 
their safety in flight. Since that date. Ad- 
miral Jervis, by a skilful manoeuvre, cut off 
a large portion of a Spanish fleet, near 
Cape St. Vincent’s, (whence the peerage 
bestowed on him received its designation;) 
but the late Lord Nelson appears most con- 
spicuous in that mode of attack which, in 
general, secured a victory. The battle of 
the Nile was doubtless a master piece of 
tactical science ; it merits notice from its 
simplicity, and, if we may be so bold as to 
use the term, its infallibility. The manoeu- 
vre he used was, to throw two of his ships 
upon every one of the weather-most of the 
enemy’s line, by causing his fleet to divide 
as it approached them ; consequently in- 
cluding each French ship between two of 
ours, fliie residue, which were moored in 
a line a head, fully expected to see ours 
lange up their whole length, and oppose 
ship to ship. They saw their error when it 
was too late ; being to leeward, it was im- 
possible for them to render efficient' aid, 
