WILL. 
6iir readers some of Hartley’s valuable 
practical remarks respecting the yvill. 
“ The will appears to be nothing but a 
desire or aversion sufficiently strong to pro- 
duce an action that is not automatic, pri- 
marily or secondarily (§. 101). The will is 
therefore that desire or aversion which is 
strongest for the present time ; for if any 
other desire were stronger, the muscular 
motion connected with it by association 
would take place, and not that which pro- 
ceeds from the wall, or the voluntary one. 
“ Since the things which we pursue do, 
when obtained, generally afford pleasure, 
and those which we fly from affect us with 
pain, ii' they overtake us, it follows that 
the gratification of the will is generally as- 
sociated with pleasure, the disappointment 
of it with pain. Hence a mere associated 
pleasure is transferred upon the gratifica- 
tion of the will ; a mere associated pain, 
upon the disappointment of it : and if the 
will were always gratified, this mere asso- 
ciated pleasure would, according to the pre- 
sent frame of our natures, absorb, as it were, 
all our other pleasures; and thus, by dry- 
ing lip the source from whence it sprung, be 
itself di'ied up at last ; and the first disap- 
pointments, after a long course of gratifica- 
tion, wbiild be intolerable. Both which 
circumstances are sufficiently observable, 
in an inferior degree, in children that are 
much indulged, and in adults, after a long 
series of successful events. Gratifications 
of the will without the consequent expected 
pleasure, and disappointments of it with- 
out the consequent expected pain, are par- 
ticularly useful to us here : and it is by this, 
amongst other means, that the human will 
is brought to a confoi’inity wdth the divine ; 
which is the only radical cure for all our evils 
and disappointments, and the only earnest 
and .medium for obtaining lasting happiness. 
“ We often desire and pursue things which 
give pain rather than pleasure. Here it 
must be supposed that at first they afforded 
pleasure, and that they now give pain on 
account of the change in our nature and 
circumstances. Now, as the continuance 
to desire and pursue such objects, notwith- 
standing the pain arising from them, is the 
effect of the power of association ; so the 
same powder will at last reverse its own 
steps, and free ns from such hurtful desires 
and pursuits. Tlie recurrency of pain will 
at last render the object undesirable and 
hateful ; and the experience of this painful 
process, in a few particular instances, will 
at last, as in other cases of the same kind, 
beget a habit of ceasing to pursue things, 
which we perceive by a few trials, or by 
rational arguments, to be hurtful to us on 
the whole. 
“ A state of desire ought to be pleasant 
at first, from the near relation of desire to 
love (§. 71 ), and of love, to pleasure and 
happiness ; but in the course of a long pur- 
suit, there intervene so many fears and dis- 
appointments, apparent or real, with respect 
to the subordinate means, and so many 
strong agitations of mind passing the limits 
of pleasure, as greatly to chequer a state of 
desire with misery. For a similar reason, 
states of aversion are chequered with hope 
and comfort.” 
AV ILL, freedom of. There are, perhaps, few 
topics of inquiry which have more than this 
perplexed the understandings and irritated 
the passions of mankind. From tiie conti- 
nued conflict of opinion which lias existed 
on the subject, in every age since the ope- 
rations of the mind of map became a tfe- 
qnent subject of investigation, it might be 
almost presumed to belong to those ques- 
tions which furnish abundant matter for 
discussion, bnt none for conviction; which 
sharpen ingenuity without resulting in cer- 
tainty, and serve to display the human inr 
tellect in all its strength and weakness, in 
all its pride and humiliation. 
Philosophical free-will, it must ever be 
remembered, is something totally different 
from external liberty. The latter is pos- 
sessed by every man who has the power of 
doing as he pleases ; that is, of carrying his 
volitions into execution. But whether voli- 
tions be free or necessitated ; whether, in 
forming these, the mind exert a self-deter- 
mining power, or be uniformly and irre- 
sistibly influenced by motives, is a question 
perfectly nnconnected with the circum- 
stances of freedom or control relating to 
their execution. The will may be bound, 
though the consequent act be unimpeded ; 
and, on the other hand, the exercise of the 
self-determining power, in volition, may be 
prevented, by numberless restraints, from 
being ftllowed up in act. The point in 
discussion between the advocates of philo- 
sophical free-will and their opponents is, 
whether man be invariably and necessarily 
influenced by motives ; or, whether he 
possess a self-governing, self-determining 
power, which he may exert by acting 
either according to motives, in opposition 
to motives, or without any motives at all. 
And though some of the defenders of liberty 
differ from others in the extent of the exer< 
