WILL. 
cise of tills power, many limiting it to acts 
of mere delilieration, and othere connecting 
it with every actual and possible instance 
of volition, the controversy between them 
and the necessarians has no reference to 
these differences, but is c.iicmnscribed by 
the single question, wlietlier, in any case 
whatever, a volition can originate indepen- 
dently of motive ; or, in other words, whe- 
ther the mind be capable of acting dif- 
ferently, previous circmnslaiices continuing 
in every respect the same. In support of 
philosophical liberty, its supporters make 
their first appeal to consciousness. With 
respect to various volitions, it is observed, 
we are not only insensible to an overpower- 
ing and resistless influence of motives, but 
are positively conscious of choosing without 
any motive, and often, even in opposition 
to the strongest. And were it not that the 
mind possessed this paramount and inde- 
pendent faculty — this liberty of determin- 
ing dift’erently in tlie same circumstances, 
whence could arise those feelings of appro- 
bation or blame, which ever attach to voli- 
tions of high importance and moral conse- 
quence? Could censure reasonably be ap- 
plied to any act that was inevitable ? oris 
there any adequate ground of applause for 
what could not possibly have been unper- 
formed? Are not the feelings of indivi- 
duals, and the consent of nations, on this 
subject, perfectly decided and coincident ? 
The repentant sinner is overwhelmed with 
remorse for that delinquency which he feels 
it was no less within his power than his 
duty to have avoided : the abandoned cri- 
minal, who has lifted his murderous arm 
against his neighbour, falls an unpitied vic- 
tim to the laws of his country. Upon what 
principle is remorse felt in the one case, 
and execution inflicted in the other, but on 
that which naturally presses conviction on 
every human bosom, that the offender, in- 
stead of being hurried on to guilt by irre- 
sistible destiny, was merely the ready tool 
of appetites which he might have con- 
trouled ; the willing slave of passions which 
he might have corrected. The lunatic in- 
cendiary is regarded as no proper object 
of puuisinuent, frenzy having usurped the 
throne of reason, and the exercise of ra- 
tional free-will being precluded by the pa- 
roxysm of disease. And, on similar grounds, 
the destroyer of life by mere accident, is 
exempt from the vengeance of human laws, 
which point their thunder only against those 
who are both capable of distinguishing right 
from w'rong, and of avoiding the crimes into 
wliich they vohmtari'y plunge themselves. 
If, therefore, any conclusion wliatever can 
he justly inferred from the almost instinc- 
tive feelings of mankind, which even those 
uniformly act upon who systematically con- 
trovert and ridicule them, how powerful 
must the argument, hence derived, be con- 
sidered in favour of that liberty of will, 
without which the agonies of remorse ap- 
pear only the gratuitous self-inflictions of 
folly ; and the most essential acts of legis- 
lation, seem the most execrable operations 
of tyranny ? The moral and religious con- 
sequences, considered as arising from the 
system of necessity, are regarded by the 
advocates for free-will as of a nature so re- 
pulsive to the interests of virtue, so incom- 
patible with moral discipline, so full of pal- 
pable absurdity and extreme impiety, that 
these alone are deemed sufficient to justify 
the rejection of a doctrine, from wliich they 
appear essentially and decidedly to flow. 
Can tliat system, it is asked, be true, which 
saps the foundations of virtue, by ascribing 
every act and thought, every feeling and 
wish, connected with moral character, to 
imperious and resistless impulse ? which con- 
stitutes man a mere machine, guiltless even 
in the extreme of wickedness, and worthless 
in the maturity of benevolence ; because in 
both cases, equally compelled by circum- 
stances to good or evil, and equally desti- 
tute of moral quality with tlie quickening 
sun or the devouring tempest ? If every 
sentiment and deed of every human indi- 
vidual be the result of preceding situations, 
which situations themselves are only links 
in an interminable series of processes, 
equally compelled and necessitating, how 
vain are all the popular and presumed 
means of operating upon the mind, to re- 
claim from vice, or guide to virtue ? Can 
there be any stimulus to exertions decidedly 
fruitless ? or can there be any penitence for 
inevitable crime? or can tlrere be any jus- 
tice, human or divine, in the punishment of 
offences committed, indeed, by choice, yet 
committed through necessity ? With what 
disgust will be viewed the imputation thrown 
by this system on the Supreme Being (who 
is considered by it to be not only the sove- 
reign, but the sole agent, in the universe), 
as the origin of all existing evil ! Under 
what character is the Divine Being repre- 
sented by this doctrine, but under that of 
a baffling tyrant, and a deriding fiend ; 
exhorting men to what they cannot accom- 
plish, and torturing them for what they 
cannot avoid, and, under the designation of 
