NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL. 
with respect to matter. It insists on the abso- 
lute and uncontrollable influence of motives 
upon the human will and conduct. It asserts, 
that the determinations and actions of every 
individual flow with unfailing precision and 
resistless operation, from the circumstances, 
motives, or states of mind by which they are 
preceded j and that, in the whole series of his 
existence, no specific feeling, thought, or act, 
could have been different from what it really 
was, these previous circumstances continuing 
the same. In the consideration of this subject, 
it is important not to confound necessity 
with compulsion, as the latter implies that 
the choice of the mind is effected with re- 
luctance, and in consequence of the exercise 
of force upon inclination ; whereas, whe- 
ther the conclusion be formed with the full 
concurrence of the affections, or after a 
conflicting estimate, which leaves reason 
completely triumphant over inclination; the 
mind is equally impelled by some conti oul- 
ing energy, and equally necessitated to the 
determination it adopts. It is of conse- 
quence also to the illustration of the subject, 
fully to comprehend the meaning of the 
term motive, which it is to be remembered 
comprehends both the bias of the mind and 
the end in view, and includes every thing 
that moves or influences the mind, and ex- 
cites it to a choice or determination. 
The grand argument in support of philo- 
sophical necessity is derived from the rela- 
tion of cause and effect. If there be any one 
principle in which mankind, in all their rea- 
sonings upon natural objects, have more 
perfectly concurred than in any other, it is 
the maxim, that every effect requires a 
cause, or in other words, that whatever be- 
gins to be, demands some antecedent cir- 
cumstances tending to its production. Of 
the nature indeed of causation we are com- 
pletely and profoundly ignorant. But from 
the invariable connection between certain 
previous and certain subsequent circum- 
stances in the world of matter, we infer the 
tendency of the former to accomplish the 
latter, and the indispensableness of the 
operation of the first to the existence of the 
phenomena immediately following, with the 
jame confidence as if a perfect acquaintance 
with the arcana of nature had unfolded to us 
its necessity. The association of ideas in 
our minds arising from the unvarying con- 
nection between certain preceding and sub- 
sequent appearances around us, becomes at 
length so fixed, that the observation of the 
first excites the undoubting expectation of 
the last ; and where any effects produced 
differ from what we have been used to ob- 
serve, and consequently to expect, we in- 
stantly presume that the preceding circum- 
stances must proportionally have varied, and 
without an alteration in these, an alteration 
in the effect is pronounced impossible. Now, 
though we predict the acts of moral agents 
with less certainty, and expect them with 
more hesitation than mingle in our calcula- 
tions on natural phenomena, this difference 
is attributable merely to our ignorance of the 
tempers, characters, and situations of those 
agents, to the difficulty, and frequently the 
impossibility, which we experience of ex- 
ploring the labyrinth of the human heart, 
and not in the slightest degree to any doubt, 
that volitions will always be precisely de- 
termined by preceding states of mind, and 
that certain volitions will inevitably be 
productive of certain acts. As with regard 
to natural objects, we are led to consider 
some things the causes of others, concluding 
them to possess over these others a neces- 
sary and causative operation from their in- 
variable conjunction, so particular states of 
mind being uniformly observed to be con- 
nected with particular determinations, are 
equally regarded as causes of which these 
determinations are the effects. The gene- 
rative and irresistible influence of the mo- 
tive upon the determination is inferred with 
as much justness and conviction as that of a 
certain degree of heat on liquifaction, or 
of cold on congelation ; and a change of de- 
termination itr the mind, while preceding 
circumstances continued the same, is consi- 
dered equally impossible as that iron should 
swim, precisely in the same circumstances 
in which it previously sunk; or heat congeal 
exactly in the same circumstances in which 
it has been uniformly observed to liquify. 
Thus in the world of mind, as well as matter, 
no change of event takes place without a 
correspondent alteration in preceding cir- 
cumstances leading to it and operating upon 
it. ITiis principle lies at the foundation of 
all clear reasoning and legitimate conclu- 
sion. Its denial would subvert all the forms 
and degrees of human knowledge. All fair 
inferetice, reasonable expectation, and judi- 
cious efl'ort, would completely cease. Ig- 
librance and confusion, hesitation and 
despair, would supersede all wise arrange- 
ment, lively hope and heroic enterprize; 
and the noble fabric of the universe abound- 
ing in evidences of the most wise and kind 
design might have started into being with- 
out any intelligent cause or preceding ope- 
ration. But a position thus leading to conse- 
