NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL. 
■HWiices the most monstrous and absurd, 
must be totally groundless. 
Every change, however minute or stu- 
pendous', however connected with unintel- 
ligent or moral nature, equally requires and 
possesses some cause of its existence. The 
steady resolves and brilliant career of virtue, 
as necessarily residtfrom preceding circum- 
stances, as the harmonious movements of the 
solar system ; and the irregularities of vice, 
demand the operation of preceding im- 
pulses, equally with the wanderings of a 
meteor. Let any specific volition pr de- 
termination be admitted at any time to 
exist in the mind ; whence did it arise ? 
Most certainly not uncaused ; unless we are 
prepared by this reply to destroy all the 
commonly received opinions and feelings of 
mankind, and tp admit, that though there 
was a period in which tlie order and beauty 
of the universe did not exist, they suddenly 
broke into being unconnected with any cir- 
cumstances whatever tending to accomplish 
so glorious a result. If thjs volition be 
stated to originate in a self-determinipg 
power acting independently of motive', this 
self-determinipg power must be considered 
as in fact only a preceding volition, and the 
question therefore instead of being correctly 
and finally answered, is by this reply 
merely trifled with and evaded. Indis- 
putably the only proper answer that can be 
given is, that the particular determination 
alluded to, necessarily originated in the 
views and circumstances of the mind imme- 
diately previous to its adoption. These 
views and circumstances resulted from 
other situations which preceded them, and 
which were the consequences of others more 
remote. And thus in retrograde niarch we 
travel thrptigh a long series of ipental feel- 
ings and operations, finding each linked in- 
dissolubly to that by which it vyas preceded, 
and constituting part of an immense chain 
which soon ejf tends beyond the reach of 
mortal eye, as much as it defies the con- 
trol of mortal power. 
Another argument for the doctrine of 
philosophical necessity is drawn from the 
divine prescience. The foreknowledge of 
events must inevitably preclude their con- 
tingency, for a contingent event is an event 
that either may or may not happen ; but 
that which may not happen most evidently 
cannot be foreseen. The distinctions which 
have been made on this subject by the ad- 
vocates of liberty, have served to exhibit 
tlie perplexity of their authors instead of 
contributing the slightest support to then- 
cause. And with respect to the nature of 
the supreme mind, it is impossible to prove, 
or reasonably to believe, that the divine 
knowledge, infinitely superior as it unques- 
tionably is to that of man, can embrace 
those things which are not the objects of 
knowledge, and exist so as to involve con- 
tradictions. To know that a contingent 
event will take place, would be to know, 
that an event which is decidedly and cha- 
racteristically uncertain, is nevertheless 
certain, or in other words to know a thing 
to be what it is not. It is only by the ex- 
pedient of limiting the divipe prescience to 
events not dependent upon human choice, 
an expedient winch some few have ven- 
tured to adopt, that the supporters of phi- 
losophical freedom can surmount this incon- 
sistency ; and the grossness of contradictiori 
is thus exchanged for the flagrance of inde- 
corum. To the believer in the absolute 
foreknowledge of God, the argument de- 
rived from it in support of the necessity of 
human actions may be considered as equally 
convincing with perhaps any argument, 
upon any subject that can be presented to 
the human understanding. If events are 
foreseen, they cannot be contingent. If 
they are contingent, they cannot be fore- 
seen. 
In addition to the arguments aboye ad- 
duced, may be added that arising from the 
consciousness which every mam feels of 
being influenced by some motive in the 
perforiiance of every voluntary action. If 
any person attempt to accomplish an act, 
of whatever nature, whether of importance 
or insignificance, without the influence of 
some motive to decide, he will find himself 
completely baffled in the enterprize, and in 
every instance he will be able to assign the 
circumstances by which he was actually in- 
fluenced. He will likewise find the spirit 
of his exertions uniformly proportioned to 
the anim-dtion of Ifis motiye. Where the 
motive is urgent, and arising from the union 
pf inclination and conviction, his efforts will 
display all the activity of enthusiasm, and 
all the fortitude of heroism. And in cor- 
respondence with the lessening interest of 
motives, his enterprizes will decline in vi- 
gour, till in tlie lowest instance, to adopt 
the language of pur immortal poet, they 
are, 
“ Sicklied o'er with the pale -cast of 
thought. 
And lose the name of action.” 
The argument from consciousness, in- 
