NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL. 
deed, is applied by the asserters of phi- 
losophical liberty with equal confidence in 
support of their system ; and it is insisted, 
that all men imagine themselves possessed 
of liberty of choice, and must, therefore, if 
the opposite doctrine be true, labour under 
a gross and constant delusion. The fact how- 
ever unquestionably is, that the convictions 
of the meanest peasant, when he is enabled 
perfectly to comprehend the just statement 
of the subject, will oblige him to decide in 
favour of necessity. If interrogated whe- 
ther, instead of going to his daily labour on 
a particular occasion, he could have conti; 
nued at home, he will reply, that most cer- 
tainly he could if he had so pleased, alluding 
merely to practical liberty or freedom from 
external controiil. But when asked whe- 
ther he could have remained at home with 
tire same inducements of duty and inclina- 
tion to go abroad ; as soon as he fully un- 
derstands the question, he will answer, that 
he certainly could not without changing his 
mind ; in other words, that without some 
alteration in his feelings of inclination and 
duty, some variation in mature cause or 
preceding circumstances, whatever term 
we choose to adopt, he must inevitably have 
proceeded to his work. 
Philosophical necessity is the only theory 
consistent with moral discipline. An intel- 
ligent agent is the proper subject of appro- 
bation or censure, of reward or punishment, 
only so far as he is determined in definite 
circumstances to definite volitions, If he 
perform a virtuous action from a pni-e mo- 
tive, he is entitled to the approval and 
praise of all observers, and the remunera- 
tion which thus flows to him from general 
esteem, and also from the consciousness of 
benevolent dispositions, from the view of 
successfifl eftorts, and the hope of future 
final reward, operates tp confirm the dis- 
position from which the act proceeded to 
establish a habit, and fix a character of 
pure beneficence in the agent, and to ex? 
cite in beings similarly constituted the 
adoption of the same means for the attain- 
ment of the same satisfaction. 
With respect likewise to censure and 
punishment, these are, with equal propriety , 
applied to every intelligent being, who, 
actuated by malignant motives, defames 
innocence, or oppresses penury, or commits 
any act tending to the production of mis- 
chief and misery. The application of po- 
pular blame or reproach, and the pain aiis- 
ing from a sense of impaired estimation, 
from the apprehension of private ven- 
geance, or legal conviction, or any of those 
numberless modes of torture which haunt 
and convulse the soul of guilt, are obvi- 
ously calculated to produce a change of 
character and conduct, to excite lirst 
thoughtfulness, and subsequently reforma- 
tion in the mind of the. offender, and to 
kindle a beacon by which those within ob- 
servation will be iullueuced to shun a road 
which inevitably terminates in suffering 
and infamy. If any being can be supposed 
perfectly indifferent and independent with 
respect to motives, the application of all 
these moral means is obviously and abso- 
lutely superseded. The door is effectually 
closed to discipline. To attempt to ope- 
rate on such a being by remonstrance or 
approval, by the erection of a statue, or 
the infliction of the torture, would he just 
as absurd as to thank the genial shower, or 
lash the tempestuous ocean ; to applaud the 
soil for its fertility, or denounce the earth- 
quake for its ravages. 
The doctrine of necessity, moreover, 
tends to inspire that moral caution which is 
of the utmost importance towards the for- 
mation of habitual virtue. Those who rely 
on some indefinable self-determining power, 
by which they presume themselves able to 
act without a motive, where motives are 
equal, or in opposition to the strongest mo- 
tive, may expose themselves to circum- 
stances and situations in which they have 
before yielded to temptation witliout incon- 
sistency, tliough certainly not without dan- 
ger. The necessitarian is well aware that 
the same situations will ever produce the 
same results, that whatever be the firmness 
of habit, there^exist temptations by which 
the most stable and accomplished virtue 
may be endangered and impaired. He 
will therefore sedulously avoid all unneces- 
sary exposure, and will be particularly 
guarded against circumstances in which his 
good resolutions have already failed. For 
though it may be impossible for him, in a 
second instance, to be in a situation pre- 
cisely similar to that by which he was over- 
powered in the first, the recollection and 
regret of his defeat making unquestionably 
some variation. This difference will by no 
means preclude that strong and striking 
similarity which must sound in his ear the 
trumpet of alarm, and prevent his again 
approaching the verge of a gulph into 
which he has been once miserably precipi- 
tated. 
It must further he observed that the doc- 
trine of the necessity of human actions 
