PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
object of the senses, that by association it is 
referred to the moving muscle, and not to 
the intermediate fibrous motions and senso- 
rial changes ; thus while writing, all the mo- 
tion seems to be in the fingers and in the 
fingers alone, though even the minutest mo- 
tion, except that which is produced by some 
external stimulus upon the motory nerve, 
implies motory changes of the sensorium, 
and should, scientifically speaking, be re- 
ferred to the sensorium, or mind. 
12. To sltow that sensible changes are 
not necessasily accompanied with con- 
sciousness, we observe, that the diminu- 
tion of consciousness can be traced in 
its various stages, from the state of ac- 
tive attention, to cases where we have no 
reason to believe that consciousness is 
excited, where yet we have abundant 
reason to believe that there were sensible 
changes; because those efi'ects are pro- 
duced, which we know aie produced by 
sensations (that is, by sensible changes of 
which we are conscious), and, as far as we 
know, in no other way. We cannot, con- 
sistently with our requisite limits, advance 
so many facts as may appear to some to be 
necessary to prove our statements, but the 
following will at least illustrate them. — Per- 
sons much accustomed to employ notes in 
singing, sometimes feel so deeply interest- 
ed in the thoughts and feelings excited by 
the words they are singing, that, tliongh the 
notes continue to regulate their tones of 
voice, the sensible changes are altogether 
unnoticed by them, they do not excite the 
consciousness. Again, many who have been 
long accustomed to perform upon a musical 
instrument, and can play with ease at first 
sight, while playing a piece of music which 
they have not seen before, can converse 
and , carry on a, train of reasoning, and yet 
play correctly : the appropriate sensible 
changes must in such cases be produced ; 
for otherwise the proper motions of the fin- 
gers could not; but they are not accompa- 
nied with consciousness; as soon as they 
are, attention to the conversation, or train 
of reasoning, is interrupted. In the same 
manner, persons accustomed to read aloud, 
can continue to read aloud, even what they 
never read before, with at least correct- 
ness, and at the same time have their 
thoughts closely employed on other ob- 
jects. The following case, stated by Dr. 
Percival, will by most be admitted as a 
strong corroboration of our principles. “ Se- 
veral years ago the Countess of — fell 
into an apoplexy about seven o’clock in the 
morning : among other stimulating applica- 
tions, I directed a feather, dipped in harts, 
horn, to be frequently introduced into her 
nostrils. Her ladyship, when in health, 
was much addicted to the taking of snuff, 
and the present irritation of the olfactoi-y 
nerves produced a junction of the fore-fin- 
ger and thumb of the right-hand, the eleva- 
tion of them to the nose, and the action of 
snuffing in the nostrils. When the snuffing 
ceased, the hand and arm dropped down in 
a torpid state. A fresh application of the 
stimulus renewed these successive efforts; 
and I was witness to their repetition till the 
hartshorn lost its power of irritation, pro- 
bably by destroying the sensibility of the 
olfactory nerves. "I'lie Countess recovered 
from the fit about six o'clock in the even- 
ing ; but though it was neither long nor se- 
vere, her memory never afterwards furnish- 
ed tire least trace of consciousness during 
its continuance.” Now here the impres- 
sions produced by the hartshorn on the ex- 
ternal organ, produced (by means of the 
nerves) sensible changes; and these, either 
through the medium of ideal clianges, or, 
more probably, directly, produced motory 
changes, which (by means of the nerves) 
produced muscular action ; and the whole 
without exciting consciousness. The gra- 
dual diminution of attention to, or the 
consciousness of, external objects of sensa- 
tion, (the beat of a clock for instance), when 
the mind is becoming closely engaged upon 
some object of reflection, must be obvious 
to every one who thinks on what passes 
within him ; and it cannot be requisite to 
enlarge on that point.— Those who admit 
what we have stated respecting sensible 
changes, will feel little hesitation in admit- 
ting the same positions respecting ideal 
changes ; because the tatter are merely re- 
licts of the former. Besides, there is ano- 
ther point of agreement. Sensible changes 
are produced without any effort of the 
mind, without any volition ; so also are 
ideal changes. These latter, when not in- 
terrupted by sensations, follow one another 
in a train, without an effort, and often con- 
trary to effort, regulated by the modes of 
connexion to which the individual is most 
prone. We believe that the position ad- 
vanced respecting sensible changes, at the 
beginning of this paragraph, is equally ap- 
plicable to ideal changes, mutatis mutandis. 
We shall give only one instance of that case 
in which consciousness entirely disappears, 
where yet we are certain, that there must 
have been ideal changes. Every one vth« 
