PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
those who have been accustomed to one 
posture while studying, find it dilficult to 
study so well in any other posture ; and 
persons who, while engaged in deep medi- 
tation, have been accustomed to any little 
motions of body, find the continuance of 
those motions requisite for the continuance 
of their abstraction of mind. It is upon 
the same principle that certain postures of 
body have a tendency to produce those 
feelings which all should have when address- 
ing the Supreme Being. — The cases, how- 
ever, in which muscular action introduces 
ideas either simple or compound, are much 
less numerous than those in which sensa- 
tions and ideas introduce muscular actions. 
In fact it is not the usual order of associa- 
tion ; and besides, it is sometimes very dif- 
ficult to say what effect is produced by the 
muscular action itself, and what by the 
sensations which generally accompany mus- 
cular action. In the next case the point is 
clearer. 
29. Muscular actions become connected 
with other muscular actions (that is, the 
motory changes which produce the one with 
those which produce the other), so that 
the former may introduce the latter with- 
out the intervention of the will. — If differ- 
ent muscular actions are produced together, 
they are called synchronous ; if one imme- 
diately follows the other they are called 
successive, and the association is in like man- 
ner termed synchronous or successive. — The 
motions of the hands when a person is play- 
ing upon the piano-forte, the motions of the 
hands and feet in weaving and in spinning, 
and various other muscular actions which 
will readily suggest themselves to the rea- 
der, may be stated as instances of synchro- 
nous associations of muscular actions. The 
motions of the organs of speech in reading 
or speaking, of the feet in walking, and of 
the fingers in writing or speaking, are in- 
stances of successive associations of muscu- 
lar actions. 
30. These nine cases of the association of 
sensorial changes are comprehended by 
Hartley in the following general theorem : 
“ If any sensation. A, idea, B, or muscular 
motion, C, be associated for a sufficient 
number of times with another sensation, D, 
idea, E, or muscular action, F, it will at last 
excite, d, the simple idea belonging to the 
sensation, D, the very idea, E, or the very 
muscular action, F.” — The sensation itself 
cannot of course be re-excited, because 
that depends upon the presence of the ob- 
ject of the sense; but sometimes, as. in an 
instance stated in § 21, the simple idea be. 
longing to a sensation is so vivid, that it 
equals, if not surpasses the original sensa- 
tion ; and it should be observed that the 
sensorial change corresponding to the sen- 
sation, is the same in kind as that corres- 
ponding to the simple idea left by that sen- 
sation ; that is, any sensible change and its 
simple ideal change are the same in kind, 
differing only in vividness, and sometimes 
equal in that respect. — It may also be well 
to observe here, that when Hartley and his 
disciples speak of muscular actions clinging 
together, they obviously mean that the 
motory changes of the sensorium become 
connected together, and not as some seem 
to have supposed, and indeed as, their words 
imply, that the motions of muscles are con- 
nected without any intervention of the 
mind (taking the term in the popular sense). 
It is true they suppose that volition has 
nothing to do in the association when com- 
plete, though originally perhaps concerned 
in the formation of the association ; and 
also that it may go on without even exciting 
the consciousness ; but we know of none 
who suppose that the mental organs (the 
mind in the popular sense) are less con- 
cerned in the connections among muscular 
actions, than in those among sensations and 
ideas. All the sensorial changes may and 
do become connected together, and the 
one may produce the other, and so on, 
without the consciousness being excited- 
but no external impression, which does not 
act by stimulating or impelling the moving 
muscle, can produce muscular action with- 
out the action of the mental organs ; and 
in like manner, no muscular action can 
produce another muscular action (except 
what may be termed mere physical motion, 
such as might be produced by any foreign 
body mechanically acting upon the muscu- 
lar system), without the action of the men- 
tal organs. The whole of the connection 
is mental, and we think that if tliis idea be 
kept in view, and employed in the explana- 
tion of the Hai'tleyan phraseology respecting 
connections among muscular actions, that 
it will remove some of the difficulties which 
are felt respecting this part of the Hart- 
leyan system, and show that the objections 
which have been urged against it arose 
from an incomplete idea of that system. 
LAWS OF CONNECTIONS. 
We now proceed to our second object 
($ 18.), viz. to point out and illustrate some 
of the leading laws of that class of associa-. 
