PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
and volition, is perhaps of very long stand- 
ing, confirmed by repeated exercise, not 
counteracted, or but weakly, by any con- 
trary associations, or by any exertion of the 
individual ; it is impossible to overcome it, 
or at least, it can be overcome with ex- 
treme difficulty ; the mind sinks under the 
trial, and the commission of the action tends 
to strengthen the association, to render the 
mind still more the slave of vice and mi- 
sery. — The picture unhappily is not too 
highly drawn ; and though the habit may 
not he so deeply fraught with unhappiness, 
few are those who can say that they have 
not one confirmed habit which they would 
wish to change, or at least to weaken. If 
these have made the attempt to destroy the 
connection between desire and volition; 
the difficulties cannot have appeared 
trifling. 
3. Law of Transference. 
38. We now proceed to state and to ex- 
plain that important law of association, 
agreeably to which associations are formed 
by means of intermediate links. We must 
here request our readers to bear in mind, 
that we use the word idea in the wide sense 
in which it is employed by Hartley, to de- 
note every internal feeling except sensation, 
whether simple or compound, whether or 
not acc.ompanied with pleasure or pain. — 
The law to which we have referred may be 
thus stated. One idea may become con- 
nected with a second, by means of their 
mutual connection with a third ; and where 
it is not necessary to attend to tliis third or 
intermediate idea, the more the connection 
between the first and second is confirmed, 
the less will the third be perceptible ; so 
that when the association becomes com- 
pletely fixed, the intermediate idea is often 
lost entirely from the view of the mind. 
The absence of the intermediate idea is 
often so complete, that its ever having been 
present can only be discovered by tracing 
the progress of the connection between the 
extremes ; and in certain cases where the 
association has been long in a perfect state, 
the difficulty may become so great, that we 
are inclined to admit an intermediate idea, 
only because we feel it in other similar 
cases, and perhaps in the very same con- 
nections in other individuals whose habits 
are less fixed.— This law, or mode of ope- 
ration, of the principle which we call asso- 
ciation, meets us at almost every step of 
our reflection on what passes witliin us. 
It may be termed the law of transference, 
and we shall state it again in another form. 
Let A, B, and C, represent three ideas, sim- 
pie or compound, pleasurable, painful or 
iudifferent. If A is connected with B, and 
B with C, A may be transferred to C, and 
be recalled by it, without B being present 
^in the mind. 
39. This is an exceedingly imjtortant and 
constantly operating law of association; it is 
thus that numerous, almost innumerable phe- 
nomena are produced, which at first sight 
appear inexplicable upon any known princi- 
ples, and which therefore are referred to 
instinct ; that is, they are supposed to re- 
sult necessarily from the conformation of 
the mind, without the operation of any ac- 
knowledged faculty of the mind. Such are 
the belief in what is called selfevident 
truths ; the pleasures derived from objects 
which do not affect the mind by direct sen- 
sations, disinterested affections, &c. — When- 
ever we meet with the word instinct ap- 
plied to the human mind, we are to consi- 
der it simply as an appeal to ignorance • 
and though it seems often to be held out as 
the solution of a difficulty, it is, in fact, no- 
thing more than saying, the feeling, or 
whatever else it be, springs up we know 
not how ; we know nothing of its origin 
progress, or exercise. The term instinct 
explains nothing, and though it is conve- 
niently used with respect to the minds of 
brutes, of which we can learn nothing with 
certainty ; yet when applied to the human 
mind respecting whose operations we may 
often gain correct ideas, it is worse than 
saying nothing, for it stops investigation by 
a pretence of knowledge. It is true, we 
cannot trace many links in the chain of 
cause and effect ; but as far as the great 
Creator has furnished us with poiwers we 
need not be afraid to employ them, while 
their employment is conducted with judg- 
ment and caution.— We do not say that all 
those feelings which we are too apt to call 
instinctive, can in the present state of our 
knowledge be completely analyzed, and 
traced to their origin ; but while so many 
can, so many too which in no respect differ 
from those which we cannot account for, 
except in the opportunity which we have 
of accounting for them, we have a full and 
fair right to say, that as attention to men- 
tal science increases, these difficulties will 
diminish, and that by degrees the whole of 
our mental furniture will be traced, as we 
can trace a great part of it, to sensations, 
retained by the retentive power, and com- 
