PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
billed and variously modified by the associa- 
tive power. — We have no objection to the 
term natural feelings, &c. rightly explained ; 
the word is abused, and often means the 
same as instinctive. We understand by the 
term those feelings, &c. which in all cases, 
where there is not something peculiar in 
the individual, will spring up in the mind, 
in consequence of the influence of generally 
occurring circumstances upon the powers 
with which the great Former of the mind 
hath endowed it. For instance, the paren- 
tal, the filial feelings, &c. are natural feel- 
ings : in all cases where there is not some- 
thing wrong in the individual, these feelings 
will spring up in his mind in consequence 
of the influence of generally occurring cir- 
cumstances upon the powers with which 
the mind is endued. So also a great variety 
of other feelings, which, with the strictest 
propriety, may in this sense be termed 
natural. — Some objection, however, lies 
against another word often used in a simi- 
lar way. Such feelings are said to be im- 
jila 9 it€d. If tlie word be understood to 
mean nothing more than what some do mean 
when they use it, that the feelings, &c. 
spring up in the mind with the same cer- 
tainty as though they had made a part of 
the original structure of the mind, all is well. 
But if it be understood to mean that these 
feelings do form a part of the original struc- 
ture, then it implies the same cutting of the 
Gordian knot, the same appeal to ignorance, 
which is implied in the use of the word in- 
stinctive. If, however, we can restrict its 
signification in our minds we shall do well. 
Let it mean no more than that the feelings, 
&c. to which it is applied, are the necessary 
results from those powers which the Su- 
preme Being has implanted in us ; in fact, 
let it have the same general meaning as na- 
tural, with rather more force, denoting the 
necessity of their arising from the powers 
which are given us, and we shall not be 
giving way to those erroneous views which 
we must unlearn before we can acquire 
truth. 
40. We need not go far for instances 
which will explain the law of transference. 
Suppose a person acquiring another lan- 
guage, the French, for instance; he learns 
the meaning of a French word by means 
of the corresponding English word ; by- 
degrees as the French word becomes fa- 
miliar to him it is imderstood without the 
English word being thought of. Here 
tire signification, that is, the idea con- 
nected with the word, may be called A, 
the English word B, and the French word 
C ; by fi-equeiit connection between A and 
C, by means of B, A is transferred to C, the 
signification is transferred to the French 
word, so that B the English word is no longer 
wanting to form the link of union. — When 
a young person has acquired some facility 
in construing French, he generally reads 
his French work in English; but when he 
has acquired a pretty complete knowledge 
of the language, he reads it in French, that 
is, he understands it without the interven- 
tion of the corresponding English words. — 
Those who are conversant with short-hand, 
can read it without thinking of the long- 
hand ; yet they learnt this through the me- 
dium of the long-hand words.— Those who 
have long learnt to read, and who have read 
much to themselves, seldom think of the 
sound of the words when they are reading 
to themselves. When we are pretty familiar 
with a subject, a single glance of the eye 
over a page of a clear printed book, will 
convey to us the idea of its contents, when 
perhaps not a single word has particularly 
attracted our attention, when certainly there 
has not been time for the mind to think of 
the sovmd of the words. We do not re- 
commend this habit of reading to young 
persons; butjimply state a fact which is 
very convenient and useful to the mind, 
which has gone through sufficient discipline 
of accuracy, &c. Now it is obvious that 
in almost all cases, persons learn to under- 
stand written words through the medium of 
spoken words. — One more instance and we 
have done with mere illustration. Those 
who are familar with writing never think 
of the printed word unless any particular 
circumstance call it to the mind. Yet 
there are very few instances in which the 
written word is not connected with the 
spoken word by means of the before learnt 
printed word. 
41. I now proceed to show the applica- 
tion of this law, in explaining certain phe- 
nomena of belief, and the origin of disinter- 
ested affections. I am not now to attempt 
the explanation of the formation of the com- 
plex feeling which we call belief, nor of 
those complex states of mind which we call 
affections ; but supposing them formed, to 
explain some facts respecting them, that is, 
to shew how these facts accord with the 
general law of association which I have 
been stating.— Belief is transferrable from 
the reasoning to the result of that reason- 
ing. Suppose a proposition depends for its 
truth upon a great number of other propo- 
