PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
others who have expected too much from 
the beautiful speculations of theory, and 
having been disappointed by comparing 
them with their own feelings in many in- 
stances, or with the general conduct of 
men, have thence gone to tlie unfounded 
opinion, that all the actions of all men are 
selfish. If the opinion of those who main- 
tain the disinterestedness of the human 
mind, had not been carried to an extreme, 
it would have been attended with but little 
inconvenience ; but unhappily its virtuous 
advocates have thought disinterestedness 
an innate principle of the mind, and have 
considered it as the first step towards true 
worth of character, whereas it is in reality 
the last ; and have therefore decked the 
commencement of virtue in colours which 
belong only to its completion ; and hence 
two practical ill consequences have follow- 
ed; some persons have neglected the cul- 
ture of disinterestedness, both in their own 
minds and in those of others, froth sup- 
posing it to be a necessary quality of the 
mind ; and others have been driven to de- 
spair, on comparing the representations of 
theory with the faulty state of their own 
minds ; supposing that they could never at- 
tain to what is considered as alone intitled 
to the appellation of virtue. — The more 
correct views, surely, are, that disinterest- 
edness is the last stage of an affection ; that 
it may be hastened or retarded, by atten- 
tion, or neglect of the culture of that af- 
fection ; and that disinterestedness, as the 
general character of the mind, is the high- 
est point of excellence, and what shoidd be 
our object, but can only be acquired by a 
long course of religious culture. — When an 
affection has arrived at its most complete 
state, in which it has no further end than its 
own immediate object, (that is, when the 
object is desired for its own sake), the af- 
fection may be called disinterested ; but as 
this term would thus be applied, not only 
to the worthy, but the baneful affections, 
we should be compelled to speak of disin- 
terested cruelty, disinterested avarice, &c. 
we shall therefore call those affections 
which are in tlieir ultimate state, ultimate 
affections. — Premising this, we shall ad- 
duce some instances which will explain the 
progress of an affection, from the state in 
which the object of it is a mean, to that in 
which the object of it becomes the sole 
end ; that is, in which it is an ultimate af- 
fection. 
43. The most simple instance, and what 
is frequently adduced for this purpose, is 
the love of money. Money is first an object 
of pleasurable feeling, merely as a means of 
procuring other things which are regarded 
as objects of desire. For a moment we 
may sometimes think of it, as having some 
intrinsic value independently of its utility as 
a means ; but we may satisfy ourselves that 
this is not the case, by observing how little 
it is an object of interest to children who 
have not heard much about it, or seen it em- 
ployed, or employed it themselves. A child 
is perhaps pleased with a piece of money as 
a plaything, but nothing further, and chil- 
dren sometimes advance considerably far in 
life before they feel its value. E. (a boy of 
seven years old) was presented by his father 
with half a crown, as a reward for a very 
succe,ssfHl and persevering effort; he was 
delighted with the approbation which was 
shewn him, and as far as the money was a 
mark of that approbation it pleased him ; 
but obviously nothing further. In small 
families children generally learn tire value of 
money early, and we therefore mention the 
circumstance as an illustration of what we 
have just said, tliat originally it is merely 
desired as a mean. As persons advance in 
life, money is continually found to be the 
mean of a great number and variety of the 
sources of present enjoyment; hence plea- 
surable feelings are continually connected 
with it, and it becomes mor e and more an 
object of de.sire. In this stage of the pro- 
gress of the love of money, it is desired as 
the means of procuring certain pleasurable 
feelings, without reference to the objects by 
which those pleasurable feelings are directly 
produced. And even in this state of it we 
find an instance of the law of transference. 
The pleasurable feelings resulting from the 
objects procured, or to be procured, by 
money, ai e associated with the money itself) 
without reference to those objects. To re- 
vert to one of the modes in which the law 
was proposed, here the pleasurable feelings 
which purchasable objects produce; the 
idea of those objects ; and the idea of money, 
are the three sets of ideas. Money pro- 
cures the object, the pleasurable feeling; 
hence the pleasurable feeling becomes con- 
nected by means of the intermediate links 
with money ; and hence money becomes an 
object of desire,without any reference to the 
means of gratification which it procures. — 
Here, to use the other statement, the plea- 
surable feelings may be termed A, the ob- 
ject which produces them B, and money 
which produces those objects C ; and by 
frequent connection between A and C by 
