PHILOSOPHY, mental. 
from the contagion of feeling, and partly 
because his moans of happiness consider- 
ably depend upon the convenience of others. 
If his companions are ill, his sources of 
pleasure are diminished ; if his parents are 
unable to take their customary care of him, 
he misses it in various vvays, he loses the 
caress of affection, or the little kindnesses 
of parental tenderness. Hence the com- 
fort and happiness of others necessarily be- 
comes the object of desire ; and even in 
children, it not unfreqiiently happens, that 
this desire becomes sufficicintly disinterested 
to forego small pleasures, or endure small 
pains, in order to increase the comfort of 
their parents, or to prevent what would 
diminish it. — Benevolence is that affection 
which leads us to promote the welfare of 
others to the best of oitr power; and gene- 
ral benevolence is founded upon particular 
benevolence ; for instance, upon affection 
to parents. We have seen tiie rudiinenfs of 
it spring up ; and that in some instances, 
even in children, it becomes disinterested : 
hut it has been in only one braneb, and it 
will be well to pursue it further. — The en- 
deavour to promote the comfort or welfare 
of others, is almost invariably followed in 
the early part of life with an increase of 
pleasuiahle feelings. Parents approve, and 
tell children that God approves, of those 
who do good to others. Children and young 
people are continually feeling and observing 
tiie good effect.s of benevolence, as mani- 
fested in their own conduct, or in that of 
others; and hence, in well-disposed chil- 
dren, the pleasurable feelings connected 
with benevolent actions are very strong; 
they are very glad to see others made happy, 
and very glad to be enabled to make others 
happy ; Ihe pleasure derived from the ap- 
probation of others, from tire approbation 
of their own minds ; the increase of good- 
will ill tlie person benefited ; and the ac- 
cordance with all the religions feelings which 
are possessed, and with various circum- 
stances less general, add such a stock of 
pleasurable feelings to the doing good to 
others, that by degrees it is an object of 
desire, altogether independently of any 
consideration beyond ipelf. A person who 
has completely gone through this process, 
desires to benefit others without the slight- 
est reference to his own personal benefit, 
either in this world or in the next: he em- 
ploys the different opportunities which pre- 
sent tliemselves to him of doing good to 
others, without thinking of any tiling more 
than the immediate object. If it call for 
great exertion on his part, great efforts of 
selt-denial, he brings to his aid the desire of 
following the dictates of duty, of obeying 
the commands of God, and where his be- 
nevolence, his love of duty, and his love of 
God, are thoroughly purified from self; to 
do good he will forego great and any plea- 
sures, and endure great and any pains, 
without a tliouglit beyond the atfaininent of 
the good whicli he produces, and the obe- 
dience to the claims of God and duty. Is 
he not now a noble being, worthy the dis- 
cipline which his iieavenly father hath be- 
stowed upon him ? And would not any one, 
to attain this height, go through any cor- 
rection or trial.? A less height is often ob- 
served. Benevolence may, with the strict- 
est propriety, be termed disinterested, 
when, in a considerable number of its 
promptings, it has no end beside tbe good 
which it proposes, and this is obtained by 
numbers ; and by those who have attained 
this height, that improvement may be made, 
by cultivating a general love of duty, and a 
regard to the will of God, which refutes be- 
yond tlie possibility of rational controversy, 
the opinion that every feeling of the human 
mind is selfish. — We surely need not show 
how these things illustiate and explain the 
law of transference, by which, means be- 
come the ends. We shall, however, just 
point out tliat the desire of doing good it- 
self may sometimes be lost from the view 
of the mind in attention to tlie means of 
doing it Some of oiir readers are proba- 
bly cctpsiderably interested in the welfare 
of institutions for the promotion of the wel- 
fare of the poor and afflicted ; these insti- 
tutions were planned by benevolence, and 
benevolence prompts their support. It is 
the desire of doing good which has led to 
the frequently returning exertions which 
are made to keep them in vigour ; but we 
have no doubt but the welfare of one or 
other of those institutions will often be 
found to be an object of the mind without 
reference to the good it does. The mind 
rejoices in its success, without thinking of 
the benefit which will result from it. As 
soon as the attention is directed to the be- 
nefits, the mind dwells upon them as the 
ultimate reason of its pleasure; but that 
was not in the view of the mind. Whether 
we have been successful or not in making 
our readers feel the force of the assertion 
by this illustration, we are confident of the 
fact, that the means of doing good often 
themselves become ends ; and that the- de- 
sire of their successftil furtherance, which 
