PHILOSOPHY, MENTy^L. 
was originally felt for them, merely on ac- 
count of the good they promised or did, is 
at last felt witliout reference to that good ; 
thotigli, on the other hand, it would by de- 
grees, though perhaps not very soon, decay, 
if it were proved to the satisfaction of the 
mind, that the means of the hoped-for good 
were and must be totally inefficacious. — 
But there would be no end to illustrations 
of this law, if we were to trace it out in all 
its operations. We are continually loving 
things because— and afterwards loving them 
for themselves alone : it extends to the love 
of duty in general, without any reference 
to those peculiar branches of it with which 
we have been more immediately concerned. 
All the pleasurable feelings arising from 
particular branches of duty, and all the 
tendencies to particular branches of duty, 
by degrees become connected with the 
idea of duty in general, wdiich is, in fact, 
formed of all the ideas of particular 
branches-, &c. which we have considered 
as right and our duty ; hence duty becomes 
an object of desire, because parts of it 
are loved on their own account, asd this 
hastens the progress of a disinterested love 
of duty in geneihl. But leaving this out of 
the question, a great variety of considera- 
tions make it an object of choice ; and if it 
be pursued as a mean to obtain the object 
in view, with sufficient steadiness, and for 
a sufficient length of time, by degrees it is 
pursued as an end, and duty is then loved 
for itself. 
46. We shall think ourselves fortunate if 
we have succeeded in giving a di.stinct idea 
of the progress of the mind from self to dis- 
interestedness. There are few things in 
mental investigations more interesting, or 
of greater practical value, than the ten- 
dency to love and to desire to promote 
things which have no immediate connection 
with our own good, without any reference 
to our own good. — That the human mind is 
capable of gross selfishness which defies all 
present discipline to correct, is a fact which 
cannot be denied, and which should excite 
our vigilance and concern. But it is no 
less a fact, that it is also capable of disin- 
terestedness which shall run through the 
whole of the conduct, and prompt uni- 
formly and steadily to the promotion of 
others’ welfare. The earliest pleasures are 
personal ; I wish not to call them selfish, 
because we seem to appropriate that term 
to those feelings which have an exjilicit 
reference to our own real or imaginary 
good, and which prompt to this even at 
the expense of others; in this sense the 
human mind cannot with the least propriety 
be said to be originally selfi.sh ; but its ear- 
liest pleasures are personal, and its earliest 
desires are consequently personal. Its in- 
terest in the, pleasures of others, arises 
from their connection with the personal 
pleasures ; and consequently the desire of 
promoting their pleasures, the love of 
others, is originally interested ; that is, it is 
in consequence of its personal pleasures de- 
pending on the pleasures of others. There 
is nothing criminal in this, it is according 
to the laws of our mental frame ; it is only 
criminal when the mind rests here ; for it 
cannot, without being wrongfully impeded. 
The good of others promotes our personal 
pleasures, and hence it is originally that 
we desire to promote their good. By de- 
grees the desire ‘is transferred completely 
from the original end, personal pleasures, 
to the good of others, the original means, 
and then this becomes an end and the de- 
sire is disinterested. 
47. We feel the glow of pleasure in thus 
tracing the progress of the mind, and shew- 
ing that its tendency is to disinterestedness, 
and that it is often obtained in a compara- 
tively universal extent. Let us not then 
listen to the degrading ideas of those who 
would persuade us that the most perfect 
benevolence is only the most refined self- 
ishness ; that all which is said by philoso- 
phers and moralists respecting disinterest- 
edness is unmeaning rant, and that when 
we call upon mankind to divest themselves 
of self and personal considerations, we call 
upon them for something which they are 
not able to practise. Wc may, with the 
consistency of truth, have a nobler view of 
our species; and we may ourselves hold 
up, as the object of our steady exertions, 
that state of mind, in which to perceive 
the practicable means of promoting the 
good of others, and' to employ them, will 
be invariably associated, witliout any con- 
necting intervening bond of union. — On 
the other hand, let no one less highly value 
the exertions of disinterestedne.ss because 
it can be shewm to arise from a meaner ori- 
gin. Ought w'e not rather to admire the 
height which has been gained by a steady 
use of the general means of worth, and by 
a right employment of the discipline of 
Providence.? Is his conduct less lovely 
who has gone through the trial, and brought 
from it disinterestedness which prompts to 
efforts of the noblest kind for the good of 
others? The original disinterestedness 
