PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
the word feelings to those complex ideas 
wliicli are either pleasui eahle or painfiil, so 
as to correspond with Hartley’s denomina- 
tion “ intellectual or mental pleasures and 
pains,” including, as he appears to do, the 
affections and passions. 
64. It appears from the preceding sec 
tion, that the mental pleasures and pains 
may be equal to, or greater or less than, 
the sensible ones, according as each person 
unites more or fewer, more vivid or more 
languid ideas in the formation of the mental 
pleasures and pains. 
65. It is of the utmost consequence to 
morality and religion, that the feelings 
should be analysed into their simple compo- 
nent parts, by reversing the steps of the as- 
sociations which concur to form them. For 
thus we may learn how to cherish and im- 
prove good ones, to check and root out such 
as are mischievous and immoral, and how to 
suit our manner of life, in some tolerable 
measure, to our intellectual and religious 
wairts. And as this holds, in respect of per- 
sons of all ages, so it is particularly true 
and worthy of consideration in respect of 
children and youth. The world is, indeed, 
sufficiently stocked with general precepts 
for this purpose, grounded on experience ; 
and whosoever will follow these faithfully 
may expect good general success. How- 
ever, the doctrine of association, when 
traced up to the first rudiments of under- 
standing and affection, unfolds such a scene 
as cannot fail both to instruct and alarm all 
such as have any degree of interested con- 
cern for themselves, or of a benevolent one 
for offiers. 
66. Our original bodily structure, and 
the impressions and associations which af- 
fect us in passing through life, are so much 
alike, and yet not the same, that there must 
be both a great general resemblance among 
mankind in respect of their mental plea- 
sures and pains, and also many particular 
differences. 
67. Some degree of spirituality (that is, 
that state of mind in which the pleasures 
and pains are not sensible), is the necessary 
consequence of passing tlirough life. The 
sensible pleasures and pains must be trans- 
ferred by association more and more every 
day, upon things which of themselves af- 
ford neither pleasure nor pain. 
68. Let the letters, a, />, c, d, e, &c. re- 
present the sensible pleasures, and x, y, and 
2 , the sensible pains, supposing them to be 
only three in number j and let us suppose 
all these, both pleasures and pains, to be 
equal to each other in degree. If now the 
ideas of these sensible pleasures and pains 
be associated together, according to all the 
possible varieties, in order to form intellec- 
tual pleasures and pains, it is plain, that 
pleasure must prevail in all the combina- 
tions of seven or more letters ; and also, 
that when the several parts of these complex 
pleasures are sufficiently blended by asso- 
ciation, the pains which enter into their 
composition will no longer be distinguished 
separately, but the resulting mixed and com- 
plex pleasures will appear to be pure and 
simple ones, equal in quantity to the ex- 
cess of pleasure above pain, in each combi- 
nation. Thus association would convert a 
state in which pleasure and pain are both 
perceived by turns, into one in which pure 
pleasure would alone be perceived ; at least 
would cause the beings who were under its 
influence to any indefinite degree, to ap- 
proach to this last state nearer than by any 
definite distance. Now though the cir- 
cumstances of mankind are not the same 
with those here supposed, yet they bear a 
great resemblance to them, during that 
part of our existence which is exposed to 
our observation ; for our sensible jileasures 
are far more numerous than our sensible 
pains ; and though the pains are in general 
greater than the pleasures, yet the sum to- 
tal of the latter is probably greater than 
that of the former ; whence the remainder 
after the destruction of the pains by the op! 
posite and equal pleasures, will be pure 
pleasure. ^ 
69. The intellectual pleasures and pains 
are as real as the sensible ones, being, in 
fact, nothing but the sensible pleasures and 
pains variously mixed and blended toge- 
Uier. They are also all equally of a facti- 
tious and acquired nature ; and we must 
therefore estimate all of the pleasures 
equally, by their magnitude, permanency 
and tendency to produce others ; and the 
pains in like manner. 
Of the Affections and Passions. 
70. Affections, passions, and emotions, 
may be considered as the re-action of the 
mind towards those objects which directly, 
or indirectly, produce pleasure or pain. 
Supposing that by association a very com. 
plex, pleasurable feeling has been so con- 
nected with any object, as to be excited by 
the sensation or idea of that object, by de- 
grees the object is considered as the source ' 
of that feeling, and the pleasurable feeling 
