PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
blended with the idea of the object, being 
the indirect or immediate source of it, is 
called love ; the contrary feeling, produced 
by contrary associations, is called hatred. 
(We do not here speak, of the particular 
modifications of these feelings, or of their re- 
strictions, but of the general feelings excit- 
ed in our minds by objects causing, or sup- 
posed to cause, pleasurable or painful feel- 
ing). When either of them, (the love, for 
instance,) is habitually connected with any 
object, it is called an affection for that ob- 
ject ; and all its various modifications, how- 
ever, and in whatever degree produced, if 
they are more than the ebullitions of the 
moment, being permanent feelings ready to 
be excited by the appropriate object in ap- 
propriate situations, are also termed affec- 
tions. If from any strength in the exciting 
cause, or peculiar sensibility of the frame, or 
peculiarly vivid associations, connected with 
objects ofa specific cast, that cause or produce 
a vivid excitement of feeling, which (though 
it may last perhaps for a considerable time, 
if not excessive in degree), gradually loses 
its vividness, and altogether ceases, or set- 
tles down into a more permanent, but less 
active feeling, that vivid, vigorous feeling 
is denominated a passion. The mind may 
have such a predisposition to a certain set 
of passions, that these may be easily ex- 
cited, and by every such excitement in- 
crease the predisposition to future excite- 
ment, and add to the strength and vivid- 
ness of the more pemianent corresponding 
affections , but the excitement itself, and 
its effect, the passion, cannot, from the na- 
ture of the mind, last long. From this ac- 
count it may appear, that the passions and 
affections differ from each other principally 
in their degree and duration. There is a 
tliird class of feelings, whicli may more pro- 
perly be called emotions, than either pas- 
sions or affections ; where the pleasurable 
or painful feelings are not explicitly refer- 
red to the exciting cause ; and have not 
that vividness and strength which is essen- 
tial to a passion : they are states of plea- 
sure or of pain, following the excitement of 
some affection, and generally accompanied 
or blended with trains of conceptions and 
thoughts. We are aware that we do not 
use this term in the sense in which Dr. Co- 
gan professes to employ it; but we doubt, 
whether in this instance the usual penetra- 
tion and accuracy of that philosopher have 
accompanied him ; and as it appears to us, 
his own use of it is essentially different 
from that given in his definition, in which 
he confines it “ to the external marks or 
visible changes produced by the impetus of 
the passions upon the corporeal system.” 
A tendency to the exercise of affections, 
and to the excitement of emotions or pas- 
sions, is called a disposition : in those cases 
in which the disposition is habitual, and re- 
gulates a considerable proportion of the af- 
fections or passions, it seems appropriately 
termed the temper. 
71. Respecting the classes of affections, 
passions, and emotions, we must not here 
enlarge. It is a most copious and difficult 
subject ; and, as pursued with different oh- 
jects, different classifications appear pre- 
ferable. Supposing the object to be, to 
take these feelings as they are, and to ar- 
range them so as to show their relationship, 
and tendency to affect one another, having 
in view the phenomena rather than the 
causes of them, we should be led to give a 
decided preference to- the elegant arrange- 
ment of Dr. Cogan, in his very valuable 
work on the passions ; but if it be to trace 
them to their sources, in order to show how 
they are formed, directly or indirectly, of 
the relicts of sensations, and modified by 
the various combinations of them, which is 
an object of the greatest importance, as has 
been already observed. Dr. Hartley’s ar- 
rangement, even if somewhat deficient in 
philosophical accuracy, as perhaps Dr. Co- 
gan has shown, must have the preference, 
having been founded on that object. The 
arrangement of Dr. Cogan is by himself 
stated as follows: “When the nature of 
the exciting cause is more accurately ascer- 
tained, it will be found to respect either the 
selfish or the social principle. Hence arise 
two important distinctions, forming two dif- 
ferent classes. In each class, the predo- 
minant idea of a good, and the predomi- 
nant idea of an evil, will constitute two dif- 
ferent orders. The leading passions and 
affections under each order, point out the 
genera. The complicated nature of some 
of the passions, and other contingent circum- 
stances, may be considered species and 
varieties under each characteristic genus.” 
Dr. Hartley’s arrangement is two-fold : 
first, the passions and affections in general ; 
secondly, the passions and affections, as ex- 
cited by the different classes of intellectual 
pleasures and pains. Respecting the lat- 
ter, we .shall have an opportunity of speak- 
ing under the different classes : we shall 
here briefly state the arrangement of the 
general passions and affections. As alj the 
passions and afifections arise from pleasure 
