his mind, exclusively of atiy direct explicit 
consideration of advantage likely to ensue 
to himself from his possession of those dis- 
positions : in like manner the view of them 
in other persons raises np a disinterested 
love and esteem for those persons. And 
the opposite qualities and actions are at- 
tended with the condemnation both of our- 
selves and others. This is in general the 
state of the case ; but there are many par- 
ticular differences, according to the parti- 
cular education, disposition, profession, sex, 
&c. of each person. The general agree- 
ment and particular differences in our ideas 
of right and wrong, and consequent appro- 
bation and disapprobation, seem to admit 
of an analysis and explanation from the 
following particulars. 
93. First, children are for the most part in- 
stnicted in the difference and opposition of 
virtue and vice, and have some general des- 
criptions of the virtues and vices with which 
they are particularly concerned. They are 
told that the first are good, pleasant, noble, 
beautiful, fit, worthy of praise and reward, 
&c. the last odious, painful, shameful, 
worthy of blame, punishment, &c. So 
that the painful and displeasing associations 
previously annexed to those words in their 
minds, are, by means of that confidence 
which they place in their parents and in- 
structors, transferred to the virtues and 
vices respectively. And the mutual inter- 
courses of life have the same effect in a less 
degree with respect to adults and those 
children who receive little or no instruction 
from others directly. Virtue is in general 
approved and set off with all the enco- 
miums and honourable appellations which 
any other thing admits of; and vice loaded 
with censure and reproaches of all kinds, 
in all good conversation and books. And 
this happens oftener than the contrary, 
even in bad ones. So that, as lar as men 
are influenced in their judgments by those 
of others, the balance is on the whole on 
the side of virtue. 
94. Secondly, there are many immediate 
good consequences which attend upon vir- 
tue, and many ill consequences upon vice, 
and this during the whole progress of our 
lives. Sensuality and intemperance, sub- 
ject me^i to diseases and pain, to shame and 
anxiety ; temperance is attended with ease 
of body, freedom of spirits, the capacity of 
being pleased with the objects of pleasure, 
the good opinion of others, the perfection 
of the senses and of the mental and cor- 
poreal faculties, &c. Anger, malice, and 
[, MENTAL. 
envy, bring returns of anger, malice, and 
envy from others, with injuries, reproaches, 
fears and perpetual disquietudes ; and in 
like manner good will, generosity, compas- 
sion, are rewarded with suitable returns, 
with the pleasures of sociality and friend- 
ship, and with high encomiums. And when 
a person by the previous love of man is 
qualified to worship God in any measure 
as he ought, this affords the sincerest joy 
and comfort ; while, on the contrary, the 
neglect of God, or practical atheism, mur- 
muring against the course of providence, 
fool-hardy impiety, &c., are evidently at- 
tended with great anxiety, gloominess, and 
distraction, as long as any traces of morality 
or religion are left upon the mind. Now 
these pleasures and pains are often recurring 
in various combinatipiis, and being variously 
transferred upon each other, from the great 
affinity between the several virtues and 
their rewards, and the vices and their 
punishments, will at least produce a general 
mixed pleasing consciousness, when we re- 
flect upon our own virtuous affections or 
actions ; a sense of guilt and anxiety , when 
we reflect upon the contrary; and also 
raise in us the love and esteem of virtue, 
and the hatred of vice in others. 
95. Thirdly, the many benefits which 
we receive immediately from the piety, 
benevolence, or temperance of others, or 
which have some obvious connection with 
them, and the mischiefs resulting from their 
vices, lead us to love or hate the persons 
themselves by association, and then to love 
and hate the virtues and vices themselves, 
and this without regard to our own interest, 
and whether we view them in ourselves or 
others. The love and esteem of virtue in 
others is much increased by the pleasing 
consciousness which our own practice of it 
affords to the mind ; and in like manner 
the pleasure of this consciousness is much 
increased by our love ol virtue in others. 
96. Fourthly, the great suitableness of 
all the virtues to each other, and to the 
virtue, order, and perfection of the world, 
impress a very lovely character upon vir- 
tue ; the contrary self-contradiction, defor- 
mity, and mischievous tendency of vice 
render it odious, and the object of abhor- 
rence to all who reflect on the subject. 
The terms which are employed to denote 
the pleasures of the imagination are employ- 
ed in connection with virtue ; and all the 
associated feelings attached to the terms 
are consequently associated with virtue, 
adding greatly, therefore, to the pleasures 
