PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
derived from the contemplation of an act 
of sublime virtue. 
97. Fifthly, the hopes and fears of a 
future life are themselves pleasures and 
pains of a high nature. When a sufficient 
foundation has been laid by a practical be- 
lief of religion, by thoughts of death, by the 
loss of friends, by corporeal pain, by world- 
ly disappointments and afflictions, foi- the 
formation of strong associations of the plea- 
sures of their hopes with duty, and the 
pains of these fears with sin, the repetition 
of these associations will at last make duty 
itself a pleasure, and convert sin into a 
pain, and give lustre and deformity to alt 
their respective appellations. And these 
associations will gradually become so strong, 
that the express recollection of the hopes 
and fears of another world will vanish from 
the view of the mind. 
98. Sixthly, all meditations upon God, 
and all the expressions of the feelings of our 
minds towards him, by degrees transfers 
all the perfection, greatness, and gloriousness 
of his natural attributes upon his moral ones, 
that is, upon moral rectitude. By these 
means we shall learn to be mercifol, holy, 
and perfect, because God is so ; and to 
love mercy, holiness, and perfection, where- 
ever we see them. 
99. Hence it appears that all the plea- 
sures and pains of our nature, those of sen- 
sation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, 
sympathy, and theopathy, as far as they 
are consistent with each other, with the 
constitution of our minds, and with the 
course of the world, produce in us a moral 
sense, and lead to the love and approbation 
of virtue and to the fear and abhorrence of 
vice- This moral sense, therefore, carries 
its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is 
the sum total of all the rest, and the ulti- 
mate result from them. When it has ad- 
vanced to considerable perfection, a person 
may be made to love and hate, merely be- 
cause he ought; that is, the pleasures of 
moral beauty and rectitude, and tlie pains 
of moral deformity and unfitness, may be 
transferred and made to coalesce almost 
instantaneously. 
IV. OF THE MOTIVE POWER. 
100. In onr general view of the primary 
mental faculties, we stated as an obvious 
fact, that ‘ without any external excitement 
of tlie nerves by which muscular motion is 
produced, the mind can produce such mo- 
tion : m other words, that state of the mo- 
tory nerves by which muscular motion is 
effected, can be produced by the mind.^ 
To account for this fact, we infer that the 
mind possesses a power or capacity of in- 
fluencing the motory nerves so as to produce 
muscular motion, which may be called the 
motive power. — Even supposing that the 
sensorial changes by which muscular motion 
is followed, whatever they may be, are of 
the same nature by external impressions ; 
and admitting, what appears certain, that 
the associative power is the cause that ideas 
and sometimes tliat sensations produce mo- 
tory changes of the sensorium, still we must 
infer the existence of a motive power, other- 
wise ideas and sensations could not be the 
exciting cause of muscular motion : in otlier 
words, whatever be the mental causes of 
muscular motion, that motion, if it begin 
from the mind, implies that the mind pos- 
sesses the power of which we speak, sepa- 
rate from the cause of sensations, of ideas, 
and of the connections among them. In- 
deed it appears to be generally admitted, 
but is usually referred to the head of 
will. 
101 . A large class of the phenomena of 
muscular motion are explicable by the pi in- 
ciple of association ; and, as far as we per- 
ceive, they can be explained only by its 
laws. There are four classes of muscular 
motion; 1. Where it is produced by some 
foreign excitement of the muscular system, 
without the intervention of tlie mind, in 
which case it may be called involuntary ; 
2. Wiiere it is produced by sensation with- 
out volition, or any other associated sen- 
sation, idea, or motion having been con- 
cerned in the connection between sensa- 
tion and motion, in which case it is termed 
automatic in the Hartleyan nomenclature ; 
3 . AThere it follows that state of mind 
wliieh we term will, directly, and with- 
out our perceiving the intervention of ano- 
ther idea, or of any sensation or motion, 
it may be termed voluntary in the highest 
sense of tliis word ; 4. Where the motion 
has been voluntary, but is become automatic 
by the influence of the associative power, it 
is termed by Hartley, secondarily automatic. 
With the first of this class of motions. 
Mental Philosophy has little or nothing lo 
do ; as to the second, till more is known 
respectiogthenatureof those changes which 
take place in the sensorium, it can do little 
more tliau state the tact. The third and 
fourth afford farther illustrations of the doc- 
trine of association, and we shall select (rom 
the Mental Priucipia such statements as will 
