PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
tensive subject of this article; but our 
readers will probably think us unnecessarily 
deficient if we say nothing respecting me- 
mory, conception, judgment, attention, ab- 
straction, imagination, and will, which in 
books on the pinlosophy of the human mind 
constitute so important a part; and though 
we think the operation of the associative 
potver of such extent, that separate from 
mere sensation and retention this ever active 
principle will furnish a sufficient explana- 
tion of all the phenomena of intellect and 
affection, we agree with Mr. Stewart, that 
the common classification, having certainly 
some foundation in nature, should by no 
means he neglected. We shall accordingly, 
in the remainder of this article, and in those 
to which we shall now refer our readers, 
endeavour to give them such a view of the 
secondary faculties as may serve for the 
purposes which we originally proposed for 
ourselves. See Understanding, or Judg- 
ment, in wliich, in connection with the 
article Words, we shall endeavour to lay 
before our readers a summary view of the 
highly important principles of Hartley, re- 
specting those phenomena of the human 
mind which he classes under the head of 
understanding, or “ that faculty by which 
we contemplate mere sensations and ideas, 
pursue truth, and assent to, or dissent from, 
propositions.” The passions, affections, 
pleasures, and pains, are usually referred to 
the general head of will : respecting them 
we have already spoken at large. Of the 
otlier secondary powers of the mind, we 
shall here give a very short account, refer- 
ring our readers to the “ Elements of 
Dugald Stewart,” (a work which we ear- 
nestly wish to see completed) for various 
sound and comprehensive views respecting 
them, mixed, we must confess, with several 
things in which we cannot agree, but which 
are so written as to delight even those whpm 
they will not convince. We shall expect a 
most rapid progress of the Hartleyan philo- 
sophy, if the principles of it should ever be 
detailed in the imposing manner in which 
Mr. Stewart has given his to the public. 
MEMORY. 
105. The memory is defined by Hartley 
to be that faculty by which traces of sensa- 
tions and ideas recur, or are recalled, in the 
same order and proportion, accurately or 
nearly, in vvhich they were once actually 
presented. — The rudiments of memory are 
laid in tlie perpetual recurrency of the same 
impressions, or groups of impressions. V 
These, by the operations of the retentive 
power, leave traces or relicts ; and by the 
operation of the associative power, these 
are united in the order in which they were 
presented to the mind. Now, the single 
sensible impressions and small groups of 
them being few in comparison of all the 
large groups, they recur the most frequent- 
ly, so as sooner to produce the elements of 
memory. 
106. Suppose a person to have so far ad- 
vanced in life as to have acquired all these 
elements; that is, that he has ideas ,of the 
common appearances and occurrences of 
life, under a considerable variety of subor- 
dinate circumstances, which readily recur 
to his mind by slight causes, he will be thus 
easily enabled to retrace other occurences ; 
for these will consist either of the old im- 
pressions variously combined, or of new 
ones in some way or other connected with 
them. This may be exemplified and ex- 
plained by the circumstance, that it is diffi- 
cult to remember even well-known words 
which have no connection with each other; 
and still more so words which are neither 
familiar, nor formed according to familiar 
analogies; but that, on the other hand, per- 
sons acquainted with any branch of science 
or of art, very easily retain facts connected 
with it which were previously unknown. — 
The recollection of ideas is also greatly 
aided by the connection of words, both 
with them and with the original impressions ; 
for words being, from the constant use of 
language, familiar to persons of moderate 
mental culture, even in various combina- 
tions, they are easily retained, and most 
materially assist in producing the recurrence 
of the corresponding ideas. And thus, 
when a person is relating a past fact, the 
ideas in some cases suggest the words, and 
in others, the words suggest the ideas. Hence 
illiterate persons, other things being equal, 
do not remember nearly so well as others. 
Hence also the importance, contrary to the 
views of education which a few years ago 
were so fashionable, of teaching the young 
to remember words as well as things ; for 
in most cases, as words serve as the bond of 
ideas, ideas will be loose and floating in the 
mind, unless connected with words. 
107. The difference between ideas and 
sensations principally consists in the greater 
vividness arid distinctness of the latter; but 
cases are known to occur, in which visual 
conceptions are so vivid and distinct, tliat 
they are mistaken for actual sensations. 
