PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL, 
wind, and thus becoming, in some degree, 
separate from the objects which originally 
were connected with them, constitute the 
abstract idea. The readiness with which 
these circamstances of resemblance, recal 
the idea or conception of the individuals 
from which they were abstracted, depends 
upon the habits of the individual, and the 
number of objects from which the abstract 
notion was formed. If we had seen but 
two or three sheep, it is probable that the 
circumstances of resemblance would be so 
connected in our minds with the individu- 
als, that one or more of them would be 
constantly called up when considering the 
circumstances of resemblance; but if the 
number be much greater, that is, if the 
circumstances of resemblance have been 
frequently, in the mind, particular indivi- 
duals much less frequently, the notion of 
these circumstances of resemblance be- 
comes somewhat disjointed from the ob- 
jects by which it was formed. And though 
it is probably impossible to have a general 
idea of any class of objects merely sensible, 
without the idea of an individual being 
present in the mind ; yet from the causes I 
have mentioned, the general features of 
resemblance not being particularly con- 
nected with any individual, those features 
only are strong and vivid, and call the at- 
tention of the mind, while all the other 
circumstances of dissimilarity have no effect 
upon it, and do not attract its attention. 
121, The procedure of the mind appears 
to be exactly the same, though less obvious, 
and usually more difficult of analysis, when 
the general idea is more remote from sen- 
sation, when, in fact, the notions of the 
quality, or qualities, even in the individual, 
niav be very complex, and this in propor- 
tion, as it is more intellectual and refined. 
In the former class of general notions, 
and even in some instances of the present, 
where the quality is definite and obvious, 
it is probable that language would not be 
requisite for the formation of ideas; in- 
deed, if the above account be just, it can- 
not be requisite. For the abstraction, so 
far as it is involuntaiy, is solely the effect 
of the frequent recurrence of some parti- 
cular qualities with which they are occasi- 
onally combined. But those abstract ideas 
in which the circumstances of resemblance 
between the composing ideas, are not very 
obvious or very distinct, either would not 
have been formed at all by the bulk of 
mankind, or at least would have been very 
confused.— We can go very far with those 
who contend that general ideas would not 
exist in the mind without the medium of 
language ; but that they could not, from 
any deficiency of mental capacity to form 
them, does by no means appear certain. 
The same faculties which now produce 
them, might have produced them without 
the powers of communication ; and there 
appears no reason why the deaf and ilumb 
child may not form a general idea of men, 
or horses, or fire, or any object of a similar 
kind, as well as if capable of annexing 
terms to the objects of perception. 
122. It can be no objection to this ac- 
count of the procedure of the mind in 
generalization, that we are able to form 
•classifications of objects from circumstances 
which are not calculated to strike the mind 
of the common observer. When left to 
itself before habits of reflection are formed, 
the mind will be necessarily attracted by the 
most prominent sensible features of resem- 
blance, and the objects would become 
associated by that bond of union ; and in 
very many cases this would differ in differ- 
ent individuals ; but it is indubitable that 
we may acquire such a command over our 
associations, that we may be able to com- 
bine objects in our minds which have no 
customary tendency to such combination, 
owing to the laws of association, by a more 
factitious connection, and that by the re- 
quisite culture of the mind, certain con- 
necting principles are either discovered or 
confirmed, which could not have been of 
any force in a more early period of mental 
progress. In the first of these cases the 
association is voluntary, and if there were 
not some apparent benefit resulting from 
it, or some circumstances calculated to 
produce it in the mind, it would soon give 
place to a more natural union. So far, 
however, as any general idea is formed, its 
production is accomplished agreeably to 
the principles we have stated. In the second 
the operation of the mind is most usually 
involuntary ; w'hen voluntary, the observa- 
tions on the first cease to apply. 
123. It is obvious that the fewer and 
more distinct the circumstances which are 
comprehended under the general notion of 
a class of objects, the more clear and de- 
finite will be the general notion itself. And 
it appears worthy of notice, and tends to 
confirm the account given of the formation 
of our general ideas, at least those of visi- 
ble objects, that the greater the variety 
subsisting among the individuals or subor- 
dinate species comprehended under the 
