PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL 
general idea, or, more properly, wliicli pos- 
sess that quality, or combination of quali- 
ties, which compose the general idea, the 
less attention, other things being equal, do 
we pay to the peculiarities of the indi- 
vidual. Thus the general notion of a tri- 
angle is merely that of a figure having three 
sides; and the varieties of triangles are in- 
numerable : and, agreeably to the opinion 
already mentioned, though we certainly 
cannot form a conception of a triangle 
which shall be representative of all others, 
without possessing the peculiarities which 
constitute it an individual, yet the circum- 
stances of its having thi ee sides is so finite, 
and our attention is so thoroughly confined 
to it, that the peculiarities of the triangle 
are not unfrequently totally out of consi- 
deration ; and if, owing to some particular 
associations, the triangle on such occasions 
were not usually the same, we should after- 
wards be unable to say what kind of a tri- 
angle had been in the view of our minds. 
124. Testate the fact respecting concep- 
tions more generally ; if we attempt to form 
a conception of any object, it must, from 
the very nature of a conception, be indi- 
vidual, representative, perhaps, of a nu- 
merous class, but still possessing those pecu- 
liar features which constitute individuality. 
—It may not be improper to .suggest, that the 
want of attention to the ditference between 
an idea and conception may have, in some 
measure, misled those philosophers who 
have denied the existence of general ideas. 
“ The business of conception,” says Mr. 
Stewart, “ is to present us with an exact 
transcript of what we have felt or per- 
ceived and, admitting the truth of this, 
a conception is that transcript so presented. 
— ^We shall not enter into the enquiry, whe- 
ther conception be a distinct faculty of the 
mind : we may, however, state, that it ap- 
pears to us to be nothing different from me- 
mory, except as being a branch of that 
general faculty ; and that a conception dif- 
fers from an idea, only as species does 
from genus ; that, in fact, without the aid of 
the associative faculty, and with retention 
alone, every idea would be merely a con- 
ception. For the recollection of an indi- 
vidual sensation, or group of sensations, 
whether seldom or frequently received, is 
a conception ; but when a number of sen- 
sations possessing some common features, 
but in others differing, are received into the 
mind, the ideas they form there by the laws 
ofassociation, coalesce with one another, thus 
constituting these complex ideas or states 
of mind, which never from their very na- 
ture can be conceptions, but which yet 
may be distinct, and when words are used 
to denote them, the subjects of reasoning. 
1 25. To apply these remarks. Almost an 
infinite variety of the sensations we receive, 
are presented to our view so constantly con- 
nected with others, that however much it 
may be in the power of the mind to attend 
to them in a separate state, it is impossible 
to form a conception of them separately ; 
but, on the other hand, there are a consi- 
derable number of qualities remote from 
mere sensation, belonging to an extensive 
range of individual objects, which may be 
considered by the mind separate fi om those 
objects, and have internal feelings or com- 
plex ideas attached to the terms which de- 
note them. Now, we apprehend, it is 
the grand ditference between our general 
notions, when concerned about things 
merely sensible, and those which we might 
call more purely intellectual, that in the 
former case, the conceptions being usually 
clear, and frequently very vivid, are very 
easily brought up by the associative power ; 
and the circumstances of distinction being 
few, and merely sensible, are, from their 
very nature, calculated to produce a con- 
ception; and so little do we po.ssess an ab- 
stractive power, that it is in most cases im- 
possible to do this without introducing the 
conception of the whole object : on the 
other hand, the circumstances of distinc- 
tion in the latter case, are less definite; 
they are frequently extremely numerous, 
and are seldom capable of exciting concep- 
tions, and consequently they do not rea- 
dily call up any particular individual object 
to whicb the general term is applicable. — 
We acknowledge, very much, in these latter 
respects, depends upon the peculiar circum- 
stances of the case, or upon the habits of 
the individual. If a person had been re- 
markably struck with an act of justice, or 
of disinterested benevolence, or any other, 
it is probable, that while the vividness of 
the impression lasted, he would never be 
able to think of these qualities without the 
particular case being recalled into the mind ; 
and if he possessed a lively imagination, or 
had been present at the performance of the 
virtuous action, would form an immediate 
conception of the whole scene. Or if a 
person be not much in habits of specula- 
tion, he would universally think of some 
example of the action possessing those qua- 
lities. — But these circumstances, though 
they tend to illustrate the operation of the 
