lias been to lay before our readers a view of 
tlie leading features of the most important 
of all sciences next to religion, to which it 
is eminently subservient ; and in accom- 
plishing this object we have endeavoured to 
show its practical value. We have, in many 
places, made a most free use of Hartley s 
‘‘ Observations and we shall think our- 
selves happy if we shall have succeeded in 
making the way smoother for an acquaint- 
ance with that profound and invaluable 
work, among such of our readers as have 
not previously paid much attention to the 
subject. To such we beg leave to recom- 
mend Mr. Belsham’s « Elements,” (of which 
we believe we have occasionally made use, 
without specific acknowledgment), Locke’s 
“ Essay,” Dr. Priestley’s “ Abridgment” of 
Hartley, Allison’s “ Essays on Taste,” and 
Professor Stewart’s “ Elements,” as forming 
a pretty complete course of reading on 
Mental Philosophy. 
130. As we have made a reference from 
Metapyhsics to this article, our readers 
will probably expect from ns something 
more metaphysical than what they will find 
in the foregoing part of it. We are not 
amoaig those who consider metaphysics as 
that science, falsely so called, which pro- 
fesses to enlarge human knowledge beyond 
the limits of the objects of human con- 
templation, as the science of essences, &c. ; 
but we must acknowledge that we are dis- 
posed to allow a high rank to a few only of 
tliose branches of metaphysics which do not 
justly class under the head of mental philo- 
sophy, or the philosophy of the human 
mind. We regard them as amusing specu- 
lations which may serve to sharpen the 
activity of tire intellect, and which, confined 
within moderate limits, may be safely in- 
dulged in by those whose time and culture of 
intellect allow of such indulgence j but we 
are no advocates for the young philosopher 
spending his exertions upon them: they 
may, and we are aware often do, deeply 
interest the mind ; but few who think much 
will be unwilling to allow that an active 
imagination, or simply the devotement of 
the mind to an object, will create any in- 
terest in that object which has no founda- 
tion in the real utility of it. We make 
these remarks witli no wish to throw a 
stigma upon metaphysics in general, but 
simply to lead our readers to reject that 
stigma whicJi many thr’ow upon the philoso- 
phy of the human mind, but which belongs 
to some only of the branches of metaphysics ; 
and of these, principally to those which the 
MENTAL. 
good sense of the present day regards 
merely as objects of curiosity, notwith- 
standing the efforts of the learned Harris 
to lead us back again into all the vagaries 
of the ancient philosophers. Whatever re- 
lates to the properties of the mind, to the 
operations of intellect and affection, is of 
high value in various points of view: as 
Dugald Stewart justly remarks, the philoso- 
phy of the mind, abstracted entirely from 
that eminence which belongs to it in con- 
sequence of its practical applications, may 
claim a distinguished rank among those pre- 
paratory disciplines, which Bishop Berkeley, 
has happily compared to “ the crops which 
nie raised, not tor the sake of the harvest, 
but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the 
land.” 
131. Physics, including in its widest ex- 
tent natural history, is that grand division 
of human knowledge which has for its ob- 
jects the properties, classifications, and laws, 
of all those things which affect the senses ; 
metaphysics, va (fuataa, comprehends 
all those speculations which have for their 
aim the properties, classification, and laws, 
of all those objects of human thought which 
by sensation alone could not be known to. 
man. The ancient metaphysics compre- 
hended many objects which can scarcely 
be said to lie witliin the sphere of human, 
knowledge, and which are rather to be con- 
sidered as the reveries of imagination than 
as the realities of intellect ; with these the 
science of metaphysics ought not to be con* 
founded. We cannot pretend to give a com- 
plete enumeration of the objects of this 
science, but it will not probably be useless 
to give such a statement and brief conside- 
ration of them, as will at least more fully 
explain than is perhaps generally done, 
what kind of knowledge it professes to have 
in view. 
132. In the first place, metaphysics com- 
prehends all investigations respecting the 
existence and attributes of the Supreme 
Being. While we state this, however, we 
admit that we use the term in its widest ex- 
tent. The most important, because tlie 
most undeniable, and gener ally convincing, 
of these investigations come under tlie head 
of natural theology, which derives its proofs 
of the existence and attributes of the Su- 
preme Being from the appearances of na- 
ture. Revealed religion teaches us what 
God himself has been pleased to make 
known to us of his character: but this, 
though a just foundation of belief on this 
point, and tlu: guide of sound philosophy, 
