PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
scarcely conies under the head of philoso- 
phy. Those religious investigations which 
most properly class under the head of nie- 
taphysic.', tend to prove the Divine exis- 
tence and attributes from certain principles 
which are suppo.sed to be indisputable, by 
a series of reasoning altogether independent 
of the marks of design in the objects around 
us. Of these, we think that those which are 
to be found at the beginning of the second 
volume of “ Hartley's Observations,” are the 
most satisfactory. He sets out with this prin- 
ciple, ^something must haveexisted from all 
eternity,’ which he thinks commands an in- 
stantaneous necessary assent, or at least 
tlie contrary of which {viz. that there was a 
time when nothing existed) the mind of 
every one refuses to admit. He next pro- 
ceeds to show, that ‘ tliere cannot have 
been a mere succession of finite dependent 
beings from all eternity; but there must 
exist at least one infinite independent be- 
ing.’ He concludes his reasoning in proof 
of this proposition, with a remark which 
we will quote, because many, feeling them- 
selves embarrassed with what may justly 
be called the metaphysical proof of the 
existence of God, arc apt to suppose, either 
that it has no weight, or that there is in 
their minds some wrong tendency, mental 
or moral, which impedes a ready assent to 
it. “ Some of these (abstract metaphysical 
arguments) are more satisfactory to one 
person, some to another ; but in all there 
is something of perplexity and doubt con- 
cerning the exact propriety of expression, 
and method of reasoning, and perhaps ever 
will be ; since the subject is infinite, and 
we finite.” Indeed, we are decidedly of 
opinion, that any mind would justly be 
deemed an anomaly which, after resisting 
assent'to the proof, a posteriori, fairly and 
attentively weighed and understood, should 
be led by the proof, i priori, to admit the 
existence of a first cause : and we strongly 
incline to the belief that the conviction 
which may be supposed to be derived from 
the latter, is in reality founded upon a 
previous, perhaps casual and even uninten- 
tional, consideration of the former. 
133. This remark still more forcibly ap- 
plies to the d priori arguments for the atti i- 
butes of God. It is supposed to follow 
from the necessity of the existence of an 
infinite, independent being, that he neces- 
sarily is endued with infinite power and 
knowledge. We admit that it by no means 
follows, fiom what we think an indisputable 
position, viz. that no human intellect could 
have inferred the one from the other with- 
out the CL posteriori proof, that therefore this 
inference has no force; but we do think 
that it is on the works of God alone that we 
can found a full and satisfactory proof of his 
power and knowledge ; when these are ad- 
mitted, however, we must resort to a meta- 
phj'sical, but simple argument, to prove 
that they are unlimited. — We do not wish 
to lead our readers to the idea, that Hartley 
confines his reasonings to the d priori argu- 
ment for the attributes of God ; for this is 
by no means the fact ; and we beg leave 
strongly to recommend to those of our 
readers who have not previously attended 
to them, those parts of his works which re- 
late to the Supreme Being; we consider 
them as a treasure of profound reflections, 
which will serve as a clue to numberless 
difficulties, which may have perplexed and 
distressed the mind on the respective sub- 
jects. 
134. Many proceed further in the meta- 
physical arguments respecting the attributes 
of God, and endeavour to prove, that the 
infinite, independent Being, possessed of 
infinite power and knowledge, must be in- 
finitely benevolent. We acknowledge our- 
selves able to feel no other ultimate proof 
of this position than (what abundantly 
proves the benevolence of God, though 
perhaps not immediately the infinite bene- 
volence) the happiness and tendencies to 
happiness which are observable in the sen- 
tient beings which fall under our notice. 
Admit the benevolence of God from his 
works, and then the infinity of that benevo- 
lence may be shewn by a simple metaphy- 
sical argument. Since the qualities of 
benevolence and malevolence are as oppo- 
site to one another as light to darkness, 
they cannot coexist in the same simple, un- 
changeable being. If therefore we can prove 
God to be benevolent, from the balance of 
happiness, malevolence must be entirely 
excluded; and we must suppose the evils 
which we see and feel to be owing to some 
other cause, however unable we may be to 
assign this cause, or to form any conceptions 
of it.” — The divine benevolence, in every 
just view which the human mind can take 
of it, includes every moral quality which 
can exist in the divine mind ; holiness, jus- 
tice, mercy, truth, all, as attributes of God, 
are only modifications of benevolence : we 
need not therefore pursue these considera- 
tions further on this point. — Connected with 
the divine benevolence is one important 
class of speculations, viz, those which re&f 
