PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
to the existence of evil. This is a subject 
which has for ages exercised the human un- 
derstanding, and still it is regarded as the 
chief difficulty with which the t heist has to 
contend. We will not attempt to weaken 
the reasonings of Hartley on this point, by 
laying an outline of them before our readers ; 
but we confidently refer to his observations, 
as containing the most solid and satisfactory 
investigations respecting it, and what to all 
'who fully admit his principles of mental 
philosophy must give views which shew the 
value of those principles which, from their 
consistence with the dictates of religion, 
both derive confirmation and lustre. 
135. Besides these objects of metaphy- 
sical speculation in connection with the 
Divine Being, there are some which seem 
to us to rank with the ancient metaphysics ; 
such as, the mode of the divine omnipre- 
sence, the nature of the divine infinity, &c. 
Such things, it may reasonably be supposed, 
cannot be comprehended by finite beings; 
and if so, they cannot be the objects of hu- 
man science, nor consequently of the pursuit 
of a wise man ; but this no more argues 
against the science of metaphysics, than the 
absurdity of the pursuit of a perpetual mo- 
tion against the science of mechanics, or of 
the search after the philosopher’s stone 
against the study of chemistry. 
136. Secondly, in the extensive sense of 
the term metaphysics, it comprehends all 
investigations respecting the operations, 
powers, and laws of the human mind (which 
class under mental philosophy,) and respect- 
ing the grounds of obligation and of human 
duty, as far as they are derived from the 
consideration of the mental frame, (which 
class under moral philosophy.) It appears, 
however, that the term is more closely ap- 
propriate to those investigations which have 
for their object subjects connected with the 
study of the human mind, but which con- 
cern rather abstract speculation than prac- 
tice ; for instance, whether the human mind 
is a distinct, independent substance, or 
whether the human frame consists of one 
uniform substance and perception, with its 
modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, 
of the organization of the brain ; whether 
the human mind is necessarily incorruptible 
and immortal ; whether there is an external 
world as the cause of our sensations ; in 
what personal identity consists; whether 
power is an attribute of the human mind, &c. 
13?". Respecting the homogeneity of the 
human frame, we have already had an op- 
portunity of saying a few words near the 
beginning of this article : it appears to us 
a purely metaphysical question, almost 
solely of importance in consequence of the 
frequent misrepresentations (real, tliough 
probably unintentional) of the opinions of 
those who hold the affirmative side of tlie 
question, and of its supposed connection 
w’ith the natural immortality of the soul. 
The fact is, that the modern materialists 
may be considered as having proved, what 
is admitted by some of the ablest natural 
philosophers, that solidity, and the absence 
of all active power, are not- properties of 
matter ; and while the principle of vitality 
is on all hands admitted as the result, neces- 
sary or otherwise, of a certain structure of 
matter, they see no greater difficulty in the 
hypothesis that the principle of percipiency 
is also. Perhaps, if the question had been 
taken up respecting the lowest of the ani- 
mal tribes, all of which possess percipiency, 
and it had first of all been considered whe- 
ther the phenomena of percipiency in them 
required the admission of a substance dif- 
ferent from that by whose organization thfe 
phenomena of vitality in them is produced ; 
and next, whether there is any essential 
difference between the percipiency of the 
lowest animals, and those which form the 
gradual ascending links between them and 
the highest of the brute creation; and, 
lastly, whether there is any essential differ- 
ence between the phenomena of percipiency 
observable in them and those in the uncul- 
tivated and almost brutal savage ; if, above 
all, all ideas of connection between the im- 
materiality of the human soul and its natural 
immortality had been relinquished, the 
question would have appeared less formid- 
able, and admitted of an easier decision. 
138. The affirmative of the next question, 
respecting the natural immortality of the 
soul, appears to us to be totally beyond the 
power of man to prove, from the light of 
philosophy at least. We have no idea of a 
substance separate from its properties ; and 
even admitting that the human soul is a dis- 
tinct substance from the body, what pro- 
perty is it known to possess which necessa- 
rily implies indestructibility? What proof 
is there that sensation, memory, intellect, 
or affection, must necessarily continue, 
when the substance with which they are at 
least united, ceases to exist in its organized 
state? We do not say, that the contrary 
can be proved ; but rve are not metaphysi- 
cians enough to discover any arguments for 
the once common hypothesis, (now, we be- 
lieve, usually relinquished by philosophical 
