PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
immateiialists), which have not been alrea- 
dy found inadequate to prove the point. 
The question seems indeed of very little 
consequence, except to those who quit the 
guidance of revelation j all must depend on 
the will of the Supreme Being ; and the in- 
dications of his will to be derived from the 
moral arguments for a future life, and still 
more from the Christian revelation, are 
worth a host of reasonings to prove, that a 
substance of which we can know nothing, 
excepting its property of percipiency, pos- 
sesses what cannot follow from percipiency, 
because we have satisfactory ground to be- 
lieve, that percipiency is at times totally 
suspended. 
139. We shall have an opportunity of of- 
fering a few remarks on the next of the me- 
taphysical enquiries which we have men- 
tioned, in the article Touch, or Feeling, 
sense of; and we therefore proceed to the 
following subject, viz. respecting personal 
identity. This is a point of considerable 
importance, since, if the circumstances 
which constitute personal identity could be 
shown to be inconsistent with the infinitely 
important doctrine of a future life, it would 
greatly affect the evidences for that doc- 
trine ; but the fact appears to be, that all 
which true philosophy has to do, is to bring 
back the airy speculations of some meta- 
physicians to the level of common sense ; 
to show either that they are unfounded, or 
that they have no immediate tendency to 
affect the belief in a future retribution — • 
That we are through life, and under every 
change of body and of mind, the same in- 
telligent accountable beings, is a fact which 
we know by consciousness ; and whether 
we will or not, we must accept of this evi- 
dence. The only question is, what are the 
circumstances which constitute identity of 
person, amidst all the changes of body and 
of mind which a man undergoes in the 
course of a long life ? If any and every 
hypothesis for the solution of this problem 
be insufficient, it does not follow that there 
is no such thing as personal identity ; but 
merely that such hypothesis is unsatistacto- 
ry and untrue. The fact is, that different 
hypotheses have been advanced on the sub- 
ject, that perhaps no one of them can be 
pronounced fully satisfactory, and that some 
metaphysicians, laying hold of the weak parts 
of such hypotlieses, have actually professed 
to believe, that there is no such thing as 
personal identity. The conviction, how- 
ever, of permanent identity is happily too 
firmly inwrought in the mental system, to 
allow any thing but an attachment to sys- 
tem little short of insanity to eradicate it. 
Whether or not we can ascertain in what it 
consists, the consciousness of every indivi- 
dual is a constant and sufficient ground for 
his admitting the fact ; and if any one should 
work up his mind to a speculative disbelief 
of it, while he continues to possess a pro- 
spective and retrospective capacity, sensa- 
tion and mental feeling, he cannot, in any 
considerable degree, as far as this life is 
concerned, act upon his opinion. The chief 
importance of such an error respects its 
connection with a future state of retribu- 
tion ; and even here the incredulity of vice 
alone can, we should suppose, produce in a 
sane mind any doubt as to the continuance 
of identity. The grand point is, will the 
system of thought and affection to which 
the word self is applied, be raised again to 
activity ; and if so, (and no contradiction 
can be urged against the strong evidence 
which we have for it), all is safe as far as 
respects the sameness of that self. And if 
to constitute personal identity it should be 
necessary that more than the same organ- 
ization of matter be preserved as a vehicle 
for that system of thought and affection, 
that even the same system of particles 
should be preserved. Dr. Watts’s hypothe- 
sis of permanent stamina, which, if not ac- 
tually proved, has never been disproved, 
affords a proof of personal identity in this 
sense of the word, which may satisfy tlie 
most scrupulous materialist, and the most 
captious sceptic. — Respecting this subject, 
we refer our readers to the work from 
which we have derived several of the fore- 
going statements, viz. “ Belsham’s Elements 
of the Philosophy of the Human Mind 
where they will find a luminous view of 
this difficult subject, and references to the 
chief writers who have discussed it. They 
will also find in the same useful work, a view 
of several other of those discussions which 
we consider as most strictly metaphysical, 
with similar references. 
140. The last of those questions which 
we spoke of in tliis department of meta- 
physics, is, whether power is an attribute 
of the human mind. “ Power, as.an attri. 
bute of the mind,” says Mr. Belsham, “ may 
be defined, the capacity of carrying into ef- 
fect the determinations of the will.” Those 
philosophers who maintain, that it is an at- 
tribute of the human mind, argue from con- 
sciousness and observation ; and they af- 
firm, that though we cannot define it, we 
have a notion of it. Those who take the 
