PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 
negative side of the question, contend, that 
all we are conscious of, is volition, and 
the effect produced ; and that what some 
call a consciousness of power, is nothing 
more than a belief, that the effect will fol- 
low the volition, which belief is sometimes 
erroneous : they also argue, that our total 
ignorance of the manner in which muscular 
motion is produced, proves that the mind is 
not the efficient and proper cause of this 
wonderful effect. — We are of opinion, that 
it is very much, though not wholly, a dis- 
pute about terms. Upon Mr. Belsham's 
definition of power, we should have sup- 
posed, that no difference of opinion could 
exist, whether it be a property of the mind ; 
but they are very different questions, whe- 
ther the mind possess such capacity in con- 
sequence of the ordinations of the Supreme 
Being, and whether, when exercising this 
capacity, it is to be considered as the effi- 
cient cause of muscular motions. In this 
sense, all causation appears to resolve itself 
into the constant agency of the Deity ; and 
we see no reason to hesitate in admitting, 
that all the energies or powers both of body 
or of mind, are simply modes of bis opera- 
tion. 
141. Some of our readers will probably 
be disposed to censure us, because we have 
not ranked the doctrine of necessity, as it 
is called, among the metaphysical specula- 
tions of this class. We are fully aware, 
that there is an abundance of abstiuise dis- 
cussion connected with it; but in its unin- 
cumbered, simple state, the doctrine of mo- 
tives seems to rank among the practical 
laws of our frame. At any rate, we shall 
not here enter upon the subject, having 
already given a short statement of the sub- 
ject in its proper place: to which, therefore, 
we beg leave to refer our readers. 
142. Thirdly, metaphysics claims as its 
own, all enquiries respecting the nature of 
infinity, motion, duration, space, &e. We 
do nut mean to affirm, that these inquiries 
are destitute of value, certainly not that 
they are destitute of interest ; but we can- 
not, as far as they are distinct from the 
practical laws of body or mind, attiibute 
any very high importance to them. The 
speculations of the metaphysician respect- 
ing duration are among the most important 
of this class, and with the selection of some 
remarks on the subject from Belsham’s Ele- 
ments we shall close this article. — A suc- 
cession of sensations and ideas is continu- 
ally passing through the miud, during the 
state of vigilance, the knowledge of which 
we attain by consciousness. The idea of 
succession is acquired by reflecting upon 
this train of ideas and sensations, and from 
no other source. The velocity of the sue« 
cession of ideas in the same person, is dif- 
ferent at different times ; and the variation 
is sometimes voluntary, and sometimes 
involunta)y. The velocity of sensations 
must always correspond with that of the 
external impressions : that of ideas depends 
very much upon the state of the body ; they 
seem to succeed each other with greater 
rapidity in the evening than in the morn- 
ing, in youth than in age, in health than 
in sickness, in a cheerful frame of mind 
than when under depression. The course 
of ideas is in some degree obedient to 
voluntary efforts ; but no effort can retain 
one in the mind beyond a very short time, 
nor can we call up any given number in a 
given time. 
143. Duration, as applied to any finite 
being, signifies continued successive exist- 
ence. The idea of duration is acquired 
from reflecting upon the succession of our 
ideas. While this succession contimies, we 
are conscious of the continuance of exist- 
ence ; when it is suspended or forgotten, 
the consciousness of existence, and the idea 
of duration is proportionably interrupted. 
Also, any portion of duration appears longer 
or shorter in exact proportion to the num- 
ber of ideas which are recollected in a given 
interval. While we ourselves continue to 
exist, we perceive that other beings, whe- 
ther similar or dissimilar to ourselves, also 
continue to exist : hence we transfer the 
idea of duration, and even of successive 
duration, to them and to alt otlier beings 
that exist; and duration becomes a mea- 
sure common to universal existence. — Dura- 
tion is either limited, or unlimited. Limit- 
ed duration is time; unlimited is eternity.— 
Duration, like space, can only be measured 
by itself; but it wants an advantage which 
extension possesses, and which arises from 
the possibility of applying one portion of it 
to another. The time that any one idea con- 
tinues in the view of the mind is an instant ; 
and during it we are insensible of duration, 
the very notion of which implies succession. 
The most natural measure of time, is the 
number of ideas recollected to have inter- 
vened between any two given instants ; and 
when all other measures are wanting, this 
will answer tolerably well. Equable suc- 
cessions really existing, and regularly re- 
turning serve as the most correct measures 
of time; such are the revolutions of the 
