PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
ten years, born and educated in Portugal, 
but in the Protestant faith ; and observing 
a large concourse of people assembled 
around a pile of faggots on fire, I expressed 
a curiosity to know the cause. She very 
composedly answered, I suppose it is no- 
thing more than that they are going to burn 
a Jew.” 
7. Need we proceed ? is it not a truth 
indisputable as that we are living for a pur- 
pose beyond mere present gratification, 
“ that moral excellence is the true worth 
and glory of man, and that therefore the 
knowledge of our duty is to every man, in 
every situation of life, the most important 
of all knowledge?” — Now moral philosophy 
is that science which teaches men their 
duty, and the reasons of it. We should be 
happy if our limits allowed us to enter mi- 
nutely into this important subject ; but we 
must content ourselves with laying before 
our readers, such a view of those fundamen- 
tal principles which are derived from the 
laws of our mental frame, as may furnish a 
guide and introduction to more extensive 
moral speculations, and may serve as a basis 
on which to found our “ rule of life.” In 
doing this, we shall make frequent and free 
use of the invaluable part of Hartley’s ob- 
servations which bears that title. We do 
not think it necessary to state where we 
have him : those who are acquainted, or 
who may be led by what we here state to 
an acquaintance, with his rule of life, will 
easily perceive what we owe to him ; and 
to others it would be useless. We also 
acknowledge our obligations to Mr. Bel- 
sham’s “ Elements of Moral Philosophy,” 
which, (though we think in one or more of 
his statements, page 370, he has not enough 
attended to the power of the disinterested 
benevolent affections), we wish to recom- 
mend to the perusal of our readers. These, 
with Paley’s “ Moral Philosophy,” in con- 
nection with Pearson’s remarks and an- 
notations on that work, will, we think, form 
a pretty complete course of reading on 
moral science, and will amply repay the at- 
tention given to them. 
8. The chief questions in morals may be 
reduced to three. What is that quality of 
conduct, affections, or character, which 
render them obligatory upon a reasonable 
being constituted like man ? What are those 
affections, conduct, and character, which 
possess this quality? What are the best 
means for the performance of that conduct, 
and the acquisition of those affections and 
that character ? — The first of these we shaU 
now proceed to consider. 
Moral Obligation. The Criterion of 
Virtue, 
9. The term obligation respects voluntary 
actions only. We say we are obliged to 
walk if we wish to have health : we are 
obliged to regular exertion if we wish tb 
acquire valuable mental habits ; we are 
obliged to perform certain actions in order 
to attain certain ends. — The use of the term 
in this and similar situations suggests its true 
import. Obligation expresses the necessary 
connection existing between a certain end 
and a certain means. Thus, if that end be 
the possession of health, the necessary 
means are, that we take exercise ; if the 
end be the formation of valuable mental 
habits, a regular series of exertions is the 
necessary means ; and, in short, in what- 
ever case we wish to express that certain 
ends can only be obtained by certain means, 
we say we are obliged to use tliese means, 
in order to obtain these ends. 
10. Obligation differs from compulsion. 
The foimer respects voluntary actions, the 
latter involuntary. Compulsion always im- 
plies some external force. Thus, a man is 
obliged in honour to pay his debts, and if 
he do not he will be compelled by the law : 
that is, if to satisfy the calls of honour be 
the end, the payment of his debts is the 
necessary means ; if this obligation operate 
not sufficiently strongly as a motive, he will 
be compelled to do it against his will by the 
law. 
11. Obligation by no means implies an 
obliger. I may be obliged by reason, by 
interest, by convenience, by honour, by 
conscience, &c. as well as by the authority 
of anotlier. Authority is one, but not the 
only source of obligation. 
12. Moral obligation respects those ac- 
tions which are denominated virtuous or 
vicious ; we are obliged to perform the one, 
and to abstain from the other, because this 
is the necessary means, in order to effect a 
certain end, or certain ends. That is to say, 
unless we do practise virtue, and abstain 
from vice, we cannot obtain the end which 
wisdom points out as deserving pursuit. 
13. As has been remarked of obligation 
in general, there may be various sources of 
moral obligation ; that is, a person may be 
obliged to the performance of his dutj’ by 
the laws of God, the dictates of his con- 
science, the hopes and fears of immortality. 
