PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
Wliatever can be pointed out as the ulti- 
mate obligation, that is, that to which all 
others may be reduced, will also furnish the 
most general criterion of duty. Thus, if it 
appear that tlie ultimate obligation to vir- 
tue is the greatest happiness of the agent, 
then we should say, that virtue is that qua- 
lity of an action, or affection, or character, 
by which it tends to the greatest happiness 
of the agent. In otlier words, a certain 
character of action or disposition is a ne- 
cessary mean to a certain end ; that end 
may be various : suppose the ultimate end, 
or that to which all others are to be re- 
ferred, is the greatest happiness of the 
agent, then it follows, that the tendency 
to die greatest happiness of the agent is that 
criterion by which we are to ascertain whe- 
ther or not it is obligatory. To suc^a ten- 
dency we give the denomination of vir- 
tue. 
14. Many sources of obligation have been 
pointed out by different philosophers. That 
is, to the question, Why ought I to act in a 
certain way which we call virtuously ? many 
answers have been given. Some of the most 
important are the following. 
15. It is agreeable, say some, to the eter- 
nal and necessary fitness of things. — This 
leaves the distinction between virtue and 
vice altogether arbitrary ; for it depends 
upon the perception of a fitness or unfit- 
ness, which can only be ascertained by in- 
vestigations, whose conclusions will differ in 
different individuals. Besides, it has justly 
been asked. What are those moral fitnesses 
fit for ? If the fitness or unfitness of actions 
means any thing different from their ten- 
dency to produce happiness or misery, the 
expression is unintelligible. We may safely 
use the expression, for there is certainly a 
beauty and propriety in virtue, which in- 
creases in our estimation as virtue itself 
gains an influence in our breasts ; but still 
when we speak of it as an obligation, we 
find the question returning. Why ought I to 
act agreeably to tire fitness of things f 
16. It is agreeable, say others, to the dic- 
tates of right reason. — Unless you can show 
me a reason independently of your asser- 
tion, in what way am I bound to comply 
witli what you call the rules of virtue ? Be- 
sides, in what respect can an action be said 
to be agreeable to the dictates of right rea- 
son, but as it possesses some tendency to 
something ? and what that something is, it 
leaves us to estimate for ourselves, and con- 
sequently does not bring us to the ultimate 
obligation which w'e are inquiring for. 
17. It is the opinion of some, whoseowncoB* 
firmed habits of virtue probably were in some 
measure the cause of the opinion, that vir- 
tue carries in itself its own obligation ; that 
the understanding represents a certain ac- 
tion, or set of actions, as right, and that 
therefore it ought to be performed. — It is 
objected, with great justice to this system, 
tliat it leaves the matter where it found it ; 
for the question recurs. Why am I obliged 
to perform an action which my understand- 
ing represents to me as right ? Further, it 
is arguing in a circle. My understanding 
represents such an action as right; that is, 
obligatory ; and therefore I am obliged to 
perform it. Why does my understanding 
represent this action as right ? Besides, it 
refers to a kind of infallible judge within, 
whose dictates appear, in fact, to be very dif- 
ferent in different persons. Felton believed 
that he did what v^s right, that, in short, 
he performed an action which was highly 
meritorious, when he murdered the duke 
of Buckingham. According to this, he was 
under an obligation to do it. — ^There cannot 
be a doubt that it is the part of true wis- 
dom to endeavour to cultivate the moral 
powers, and then leave the actions entirely 
(except in extreme cases) to their sugges- 
tions. But to state, tliat an action is obli- 
ligatory, because the understanding, or the 
conscience, (for it comes to the same thing) 
represents it as right, is to sanction as vir- 
tuous, some of the most depraved actions ; 
for some of the most depraved actions have 
been performed by those who thought it right 
to perform them. — The fact appears to be, 
that the advocates for thb system, having 
spent much of their lives in cultivating their 
moral ideas, and finding them always cor- 
rect, have acquired the habit of acting im- 
plicitly upon them, and hence have judged, 
that because they were represented by our 
conscience as right, therefore they were 
obligatory. This appears a sufficient obli- 
gation for those who have well-cultivated 
consciences ; but it will answer in no other 
cases, and the question still recurs. Why is 
this action obligatory ? 
18. Because, say others, it is agreeable 
to the dictates of the conscience. — .The ob- 
servations under the last head have antici- 
pated what might be made here. When 
we analyze the grounds of the moral feel- 
ings and sentiments, (see Phu.osophv, 
mental). We shall see, that they can- 
not be safely made the infallible ^nile of 
our conduct, still less can they furnish the 
ground of obligation. — It cannot, however, 
