PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
as those whose superiority over them is 
very great. — In fine, then and then only is 
science a worthy object of pursuit, as a 
primary object, when it is pursued with 
just views ; when it is valued for its ten- 
dency to form valuable mental habits, and 
to cultivate moral ones ; when we appre- 
ciate its value by its enlarging our capacity 
of usefulness to our fellow men, and by its 
enabling ns to raise our minds from sense 
to intellect ; when we make it the path to 
religious and moral worth. As a means, it 
is highly conducive to the purification and 
perfection of our nature ; pursued as an end, 
it will engross the affections, and the more 
noble and fascinating, than the sordid or sen- 
sible pleasures, will by degrees become a 
more dangerous and obstinate evil than 
those. 
III. ESTIMATE OF THE PLEASURES OF 
AMBITION. 
(Philosophy, mental, § 75 — 78). 
39. That the pleasures of honour ought 
not to be made a primary object of pursuit, 
appears fiom the following considerations. 
An eager desire of the pleasures of honour, 
and an earnest endeavour to obtain them, 
has a manifest tendency to disappoint itself. 
The merit of actions, that is that property 
for which they are extolled, and the agent 
loved or esteemed, is that they proceed 
from benevolence, or some other moral or 
religious consideration : vrhereas if the de- 
sire of praise form any considerable part of 
the motive, we censure rather than com- 
mend. But if praise be supposed the 
greatest good, the desire of it will prevail 
over other desires, and vanity, self conceit, 
and pride, qualities which all regard as 
contem.ptible, will be the necessary con- 
sequents. — Again, if praise be considered 
as the supreme good of the species, what 
is there which shall be selected as the 
greatest subject of encomium. What is 
there which shall be the universal object 
of praise, as well as within the reach of 
every one. External advantages, riches, 
beauty, strength, &c. These are neither 
in the power of all, nor universally com- 
mended. Great talents, wit, sagacity, in- 
vention, these though more the subjects of 
encomium fall to the lot of very few only. 
In short virtue alone is both universally 
esteemed and in the power of all who are 
sufficiently desirous to attain it. But virtue 
cannot consist with the pursuit of praise, 
much less with its being made a primary 
object. Hence it ought not to be made 
such. — Even those who possess the advan- 
tages which are made the subject of praise, 
can seldom pursue praise with success. 
Praise cannot be tlie lot of many, because 
it supposes something extraordinary in the 
thing praised ; so that he who pursues it 
must either have a very good opinion of 
himselfj which is a dangerous quality in the 
seeker of praise, or allow that there are many 
chances against him. — The same conclusion 
is drawn, if we consider the progress of the 
pleasures of honour. Children are pleased 
with encomiums upon any advantageous 
circumstances which relate to them, but 
this wears off by degrees ; and as we ad- 
vance in life we learn more and more to 
confine our pleasures of tliis kind, to things 
within our own power, and to virtue. In 
like manner the judicious part of mankind, 
that is those whose praise is most valued, 
give it only to virtue and those feelings and 
habits of which virtue is the basis. Here 
again is a manifest subserviency of these 
pleasures to virtue: they not only tell us 
that they are not our ultimate end, but 
shew us what is. 
40. There is something extremely ab* 
surd and ridiculous in supposing a pei’son 
to be perpetually feasting his mind with the 
praises that already are, or which he hopes 
will be hereafter given to him. And yet 
unless a man does this, which besides 
would incapacitate him for deserving or 
obtaining praise, how can he fill up a thou- 
sandth part of Ids time with the pleasures 
of ambition. — Further, men who are much 
commended are apt to think themselves 
above the level of the rest of the world, 
and it is evident that praise from inferiors 
wants much of the high relish those expect 
who make praise an object : it is even un- 
easy and painful to a man to hear himself 
commended, though he may think it his 
due, by a person whom he does not think 
qualified to judge. And in this, view of 
things a mind which has acquired truly 
philosophical and religious notions sees im- 
mediately that all the praises of mankind 
are comparatively of no value, because no 
man can be a thoroughly competent judge 
of the actions and motives of others. — Lastly, 
the desire of praise carries us from less to 
greater circles of applauders at greater dis- 
tances of time and place ; hence it neces- 
sarily inspires us with an eager hope of a 
future life. Now all reflections upon a 
future life, the new scenes which will be un- 
folded there, tire discoveries which will then 
