PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
be made of the secrets of all hearts, must 
cast a damp upon every ambition except a 
virtuous one, and produce diffidence even 
in those who have the best testimony of 
their conscience. 
Regulation of the Pleasures of Honour. 
. 41. We have already seen sufficient ground 
for the position, that it is a law of our na- 
tures, that the inferior sources of happiness 
are most productive of happiness when not 
made the primary objects of pursuit but 
submit to the direction of the higher means. 
This is eminently the case with respect to 
the pleasures of honour. They may un- 
doubtedly be obtained in their lughest de- 
gree, and in their greatest perfection, by 
paying a strict regard to the 'precepts of 
benevolence, piety, and the moral senses. 
— These precepts lead to the attainment of 
those qualites, and the performance of those 
actions, whose value is universally felt, and 
universally admitted ; and at the same time 
preserve from that ostentatious display of 
them, or of other supposed grounds of 
honour, which would render their possessor 
ridiculous or contemptible. Honour is cer- 
tainly affixed by the bulk of mankind to 
actions of benevolence, such as acts of gene- 
rosity, compassion, public spirit, &c., and 
the encomiums bestowed upon such actions 
are one principal source of the feelings of 
the moral sense. The maximum of honour, 
therefore, must coincide with benevolence, 
and the moral sense, and consequently with 
piety also, which is closely connected with 
them. It must, however, be admitted that 
direct acts of piety are by no means calculat- 
ed to gain the honour of the world in general, 
but, on the contrary, they expose to the re- 
proach of enthusiasm, superstition, &c. ; 
on the other hand, however, it must also be 
admitted, that humility, whieh is the prin- 
cipal of all the qualifications which recom- 
mend men to the world, cannot be obtain- 
ed in any high degree without piety. Hence 
piety directly leads to tire honour of men, 
and at the same time in proportion as piety 
increases in its efficacy on the mind, the 
fear of this censure gradually diminishes. 
42. The grand source of honour, directly 
or indirectly, is the tendency of an action 
or disposition to happiness of some kind or 
other, occuring to a man’s self, or to the 
world by his means. He, therefore, who 
is most happy in himself, and contributes 
most to the happiness of others, must in the 
end, from the very law of our natures, have 
the greatest quantity of honourable associa- 
tions conferred upon him. But it has already 
appeared, in part, that benevolence, piety, 
and the moral sense, are the only ti'ue last- 
ing sources of private happiness ; and that 
the greatest public happiness arises from 
tliem cannot be doubted by any one ; hence 
he in whom these qualities are prevalent, 
will as far as his character is known and 
understood, obtain the applause of all, both 
good and bad. The esleem of the good he 
will first obtain, because they can most 
easily estimate his worth; and it is this 
alone w'hich is valuable and useful in excit- 
ing to honourable attainments. 
43. In proportion as the views extend, 
and the comprehension of the mind in- 
creases, the desire of honour, esteem, and 
approbation, will require higher sources of 
gratification than that of men, even of the 
wise and good : it rises even to the throne 
of the Most High, and from him to whom 
all hearts are open, humbly hopes for appro- 
bation. This greatest of all honours can 
undeniably be obtained only by a regard 
to piety, benevolence, and the moral sense. 
If the desire of it be not the desire of our 
minds, it must arise from such inattention i 
to the most important relations in which we 
stand, as is totally inconsistent with our 
true happiness ; and if it become a ruling 
principle of our minds, all encomiums will 
derive their value from their consistency 
with the highest standard of honour. 
On the Effects of Pride and Vanity. 
44. Before we offer any remarks on this 
point, it may be requisite that we explain 
in what manner we use our terms, since 
they are employed with great latitude, so 
as to throw discredit upon ethical represen- 
tations respecting pride and vanity; and 
since by the transference of the associa- 
tion connected with what is called laudable 
pride, to a quality of the mind which in 
every shape of it is a vice, that abhorrence 
of it is diminished, which its obvious ill 
consequences should always produce. By 
pride, we understand an unjust feeling of 
superiority over others, or of elevation in 
the scale by which the individual estimates 
honour ; by vanity, an excessive desire of 
the praise or good opinion of others. The 
former indieates an unfounded opinion as to 
the title to honour : the latter is generally 
acompanied with some opinion of that kind 
but does not necessarily imply more than 
an eager desire of it. 
45. Pride and vanity may exist almost 
