PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
pride is less confirmed, or whose minds are 
more dependent, that pride leads to vanity. 
Their own high ideas of their own powers 
and attainments, require the sympathy of 
others to render them steady. Precisely 
as pride or vanity has the predominance, the 
want of such gratification will lead to greater 
independence, or greater submission ; in the 
one case leaving the mind to the wayward 
wanderings of its own feelings, in the other 
forging more firmly the shackles which bind 
it to the world. Happy they who have 
learnt from various discipline, that higher 
approbation is to be sought for than the ap- 
probation of the world, or even than their 
own, and that neither possesses permanent 
value, except where sanctioned by that 
which, when once the ruling object of the 
mind, will make all others comparatively in- 
significant. 
48. We have stated that both pride and 
vanity may exist independently of each 
other : from what we have advanced it ap- 
pears, that pride will exist thus separately 
only in a vigorous mind, vanity, we would 
add, will be found independently of pride 
only in a weak mind. He who cannot rest 
satisfied without the sympathy of others, 
must be ever varying in his ideas, and fickle 
in his conduct. Without it he will possess 
no firmness, and with it no decision. The 
approbation which pride claims as its due, 
vanity seeks as a favour : if it receive it not, 
the vain mind desponds, for it has not learned 
to trust in itself. 
49. It is difficult to form a comparative 
estimate of the injurious effects of pride and 
vanity. When the soil is good, both may 
produce good fruit : perhaps, however, pride 
presents the most effectual obstacles to im- 
provement, and vanity tends most to render 
that improvement ineffectual. In the early 
periods of life the good opinion of others is 
the highest stimulus which the mind can re- 
ceive, and, well dii'ected, it has its full effect 
in prompting to the attainment of moral and 
mental excellence. The circle at first is 
narrow : the tew friends on whom W’e de- 
pend for the various comforts and enjoy- 
ments of life, are those, whose good /opinion 
forms our first object'. If these are, for- 
tunatelyfor us, correct in their appreciation 
of worth, their good opinion is the source of 
future excellence, it prompts to the forma- 
tion of the most valuable habits, and lays 
the foundation for that desire of honour 
which afterw'ards raises the mind to him 
whose approbation is happiness. If they 
make their approbation depend upon right 
conduct, and do not lavish their praise or 
their censure, but give it only where justly 
estimated, praise or censure is due, the re- 
sult is valuable; if they teach to value the 
praise of the wbe and the good only, vanity 
will in time be brought within proper limits ; 
but they do not do all if they do not teach 
that the pleasure which they at present re- 
ceive from their friends, is afterwards to be 
chiefly sought for in that of their best friend, 
that his approbation is to be made the cri- 
terion of excellence, and that by this they 
must appreciate the worth of all /other 
sources of honour. If indiscriminate vanity 
be not thus checked, the mind which seeks 
the good opinion of others will fall into the 
opinions and practices of others ; unsteadi- 
ness of principle and of conduct must be ex- 
pected, for that on which they are founded 
is variable as the wind. The stimulus of 
praise becomes necessary to happiness ; and 
the mind is incapable of exertion where that 
praise is not to be obtained ; is incapable 
of acting in opposition to the opinion of 
those whose censures it deems the worst of 
evils, whose praise it regards as the chief of 
goods. — The excessive desire of the good 
opinion even of the wise and good, is inju- 
rious to the mind. It enervates its powers 
of action, it renders it fickle and inconstant: 
it prevents from efforts leading to high utility, 
where those efforts may be misinterpreted : 
it checks the attention which should be 
paid to superior honour; and it prevents 
that ardent desire for the highest approba- 
tion which should be made, as far as possible, 
the primary object of pursuit. 
50. The virtue of humility is the most dif- 
ficult to acquire of ail the train, yet it is this 
.which gives the true grace to the character. 
It is the characteristic of Christianity, and it 
is in this respect that the Christian so far ex- 
cels the stoical system of morality ; ti/e 
whole structure of the latter vr as laid upon 
the foundation of human pride, and though 
frequently captivating to the imagination, 
which loves to view the elevated mind, yet 
it often affords a poor shelter to the children 
of humanity. Humility does not direct us 
to estimate ourselves lower than impartiality 
requires ; but it is seldom that we need fear 
wandering into tliis extreme, except where 
it arises from that self diffidence, which dis- 
trusts merely because vanity has not yet 
lent its support. This excess of diffidence 
is not unfreqiiently the cause of vanity ; for 
the mind then feels the more eager desire to 
be well in the estimation of others, and, 
when tlieir good opinion is obtained, fosters 
