PHILOSOPHY, MOHAE, 
Iiimself in a disposition to use thein, not 
from any particularly vivid love of his 
neighbour, or of God, or from a .sense 
of duty, but entirely from the view of pri- 
vate happiness.. — Refined self-interest is 
neither so common nor so conspicuous, in 
real life, as the gross selfinterest. It rises 
late, and is never in any great magnitude in 
the bulk of mankind, though the want of 
the previous pleasures of sympathy, religion, 
and the moral sense, and in some it scarcely 
prevails at all ; whereas gross self-interest 
rises early in infancy, and arrives at a con- 
siderable magnitude before adult age. 
56. The objections which lie against mak- 
ing the pursuit of refined selfinterest our 
ultimate object, though less obvious, do not 
appear less weighty than those which lie 
against gross selfinterest.— In the first 
place, the mind which has so far advanced 
towards perfection, as to make the means of 
obtaining the refined pleasures of leligion 
and virtue the primary object, will be more 
likely, finally, to stop at this point than he 
who was guided by gross self interest. 
There is less the appearance of deficiency, 
and less opposition between it and the 
claims of benevolence and piety ; and as it 
leads to the performance of laudable actions, 
the conscience is too apt to give approba- 
tion where, if all that influenced the mind 
were brought into full view, nothing but 
self would be seen. Hence there is little 
inducement to refine the motives, and purify 
them from their baser alloy ; and making 
self continually the motive, checks the natu- 
ral progress of the affections to complete 
disinterestedness. 
57. To act with a direct view to the 
pleasures of benevolence and piety, seems 
to carry with it a degree of selfishness little 
superior to that of the refined sensualist, 
who chooses from among the objects of his 
degraded taste such only as will give the 
least alloyed pleasures, and those of the 
most continued duration. It differs from 
his selfishness, in producing to society more 
valuable effects ; but from what has been 
stated respecting the progress of the affec- 
tions in mental Philosophy, it appears 
that it is very considerably below that state 
in which the affection is perfect : and we 
have already seen that it stops its progress 
towards that perfection. It may fairly be 
admitted in the commencement of a vir- 
tuous course as a step towards improve- 
ment ; but if the mind be suffered to rest 
here, we cannot esteem its progress great. — 
In addition to these objections, some very 
forcible ones will appear among those wliidi 
lie against acting with an explicit view to 
our greatest happiness on the whole, making 
even the highest least debasing, because 
least specific kind of self-interest, our ground 
of action. 
58. Rational self-interest is certainly to 
be put upon a very different footing from 
the gross and refined ; agreeably to which 
the scriptures promise general hopes and 
fears, and especially those of a future state, 
and inculcate them a,s good and proper 
motives : and they may, therefore, certainly 
be considered as auxiliary in our moral pro- 
gress. But Christianity holds out still more 
refined motives, distinct from hope and 
fear, — the love of God and our neighbour, 
the law of our minds, &c. that is the motives 
of sympathy, theoiiathy, and the moral 
sense. Rational selfinterest will lead to 
the formation of these, and to the destruc- 
tion of the impure motives to action ; and 
precisely as far as it does this, it may be 
reckoned a virtue. When it tends to cherish 
the impure motives, or simply to obstruct 
the growth of the pure motives, then it must 
be considered as a vice. That w'e ought 
not to rest satisfied with that state in the 
moral progress, in which an explicit and 
direct view to the greatest general happi- 
ness or misery is made the primary motive 
to action, may be argued from the consi- 
deration, that a constant attention even to 
these most general hopes and fears would 
extinguish', by degrees, our love of God and 
our neighbour, and this e.specially by aug- 
inenting the ideas and desires which centre 
immediately in self to an undue height. — 
While our own happiness, even the most 
refined and general, is the explicit motive, 
benevolence and piety will never acquire 
that disinterestedness which will prompt to 
their respective course of conduct, without 
any exterior stimulus, simply by the im- . 
pulse of the affection.— Rational self-interest 
will at times he present to the mind even of 
those who have advanced highest in the 
scale of present excellence ; and in the early 
stages of the moral progress, may be called 
in as a most careful auxiliary, and impor- 
tant support; but even this must be made 
subordinate to the cultivation of those affec- 
tions, which are only perfect as they ap- 
proach disinterestedness. 
59. We shall conclude this head in the 
words ot Dr. Reid, with a few alterations. 
— Though a steady pursuit of our own real 
good may, in an enlightened mind, produce 
a degree of virtue which is entitled to soma 
