PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
Bibral Sense of others, two motives should 
induce us to regard its dictates. The one 
is purely benevolent: we ought not to 
throw any impediment in the way of the 
duty of others : the other is, that prudence 
and humility direct, that we use the expe- 
rience and the feelings produced by great 
moral culture, as guides of our own con- 
duct. 
79. Thirdly, it is very proper tliat, in all 
deliberate actions, we weigh, as well as we 
can, the probable consequences on each 
side, and sutfer the balance to have some 
influence in ail cases, and particularly wdiere 
the other rules do not interfere, or where 
they fail of application. But they are ge- 
nerally the dictates of self-interest and 
pride, to be determined by our own judg- 
ments, as to consequence, in opposition to 
rules of duty. 
80. Fourthly. The impulse of the more 
instantaneous emotions of good-will and 
compassion will not always furnish a suffi- 
cient guide ; at the same time they ought 
to have great regard paid to them, lest we 
contract - a philosophic hardness of heart 
by pretending to act upon higher and more 
extensively benevolent views than vulgar 
minds, or the more feeling sex, &c. Some, 
however, carry this much too far on the 
other side, and encourage many public mis- 
chiefs through a false, misguided tenderness 
to criminals, persons in distress through 
present vice, &c. When feeling is thus 
made tl)e guide of conduct, lie who can 
best play upon the sympathy, and best de- 
corate bis tale of woe, will meet with a re- 
ward for his ingenuity, due only to the mo- 
dest merit which shrinks from the public 
view, or at least obtrudes not itself upon 
our notice. The injury done to society at 
large by tliis ill-directed compassion, so ge- 
nerally prevalent because it gratifies with- 
out trouble, is very great indeed ; and while 
we have it in our power to cultivate com- 
passion and sympathy, by the view and the 
relief of real misery and suffering worth, 
the desire of such cultivation is scarcely 
sufficient to exculpate us, when our minds 
have acquired some degree of comprehen- 
sion, from the charge of preferring a selfish, 
indolent gratification to the good of others. 
To use the words of the elegant Stewart, 
“ the dictates of reason and conscience in- 
form us, in language which it is impossible 
to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to 
check the most amiable and pleasing emo- 
tions of the heart ; to withdraw, for exam- 
ple, from the sight of those distresses which 
stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and to 
deny ourselves that exquisite luxuiy which 
arises from the exercise of humanity.” 
81. Fifthly, the rule of placing ourselves 
in the several situations of tlie persons con- 
cerned, and inquiring what we should then 
expect, is of excellent use for directing, in- 
forcing, and restraining our actions, and 
for producing in us*a steady, constant sense 
of what is fit and equitable. — This rule is so 
comprehensive, that it may be called the 
stun and substance of Christian morality. It 
has been objected by some, that it teaches 
nothing, for it shows not what justice is ; 
and that it is an improper rule, for we 
ought not to do to others what we should 
wish them to do to us, but what we may 
justly expecttliem to do to us. But this is 
no real objection. The object of the rule 
most probably is, to serve as a criterion of 
duty which should counteract the impres- 
sions of self. We never need fear lest we 
should carry our imaginary substitution to 
too great a length, and think of what pas- 
sion or interest might lead us to expect: 
when not under the influence of passion 
or interest, it is more than probable that 
we shall be guided snffieiently accurately. 
Our only danger is, lest we should not 
go far enough, that we should admit of 
this principle, which, if circumstances had 
been real, ought to have had no place. — 
This rule of duty, says Dr. Reid, compre- 
hends every rule of justice without excep- 
tion. It comprehends all the relative duties^ 
arising either from the more permanent re- 
lations of parent and child, of master and 
servant, of magistrate and subject, of hus- 
band and wife, or from the more transient 
relations of rich and poor, of buyer and sel- 
ler, of debtor and creditor, of benefactor 
and beneficiary, of friend and enemy. It 
comprehends every duty of charity and hu- 
manity, and even of courtesy and good 
manners. — He who acts invariably by this 
rule, will never deviate from the principle 
of his duty but from an error of his judg- 
ment. 
82. The word justice (says Mr. Stewart, 
in his “Outlines”), in its most extensive 
signification, denotes that disposition which 
leads us, where our own temper, or pas- 
sions, or interest, are concerned, to deter- 
mine and to act without being biassed by 
partial considerations. In order to free our 
minds from the influence of these, ^pe- 
rience teaches us cither to recoUeet the 
judgments we have formerly passed in simi- 
lar circumstances, on the conduct of others; 
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