PHILOSOPHY, MORAL. 
or to state cases to ourselves in which we, 
and all.onr personal concerns, are entirely 
left out of tlie question. — Justice operateSj 
tirst, in restraining the partialities of the 
temper and of the passions ; and, secondly, 
in restraining the par tialities of selfishness, 
where a competition takes place between 
our interests and tho^e of other men. These 
two modifications of justice may be distin- 
guished from each other, by calling the first 
candour, the second .integr ity, of honesty. 
The Professor’s remarks on the subject of 
candour are very valuable and important ; 
and we deem no apology necessary for lay- 
ing them before our readers. This disposi- 
tion, he observes, may be considered in 
three points of view; as it is displayed 
in judging of the talents of others; in 
judging of their intentions ; and in contro- 
versy. 
83. The difficulty of estimating candidly 
the talents of other men arises, in a great 
measure, from the tendency of emulation, to 
degenerate into envy. Notwithstanding the 
reality of the theoretical distinction between 
these dispositions of mind, it is certain that 
in practice nothing is more arduous than to 
realise it completely ; and to check that 
self-partiality, which, while it leads us to 
dwell on our own personal advantages, and 
to magnify them in our own estimation, 
prevents us either from attending sufficient- 
ly to the merits of others, or from viewing 
them in the most favourable light. Of all 
this a good man will soon be satisfied from 
his own experience ; and he will endeavour 
to guard against it as far he is able, by judg- 
ing of the pretensions of a rival, or even of 
an enemj’, as he would have done if there 
had been no interference between his claim.s 
and theirs. In other words, he will endea- 
vour to do. justice to their merits, and to 
bring himself, if possible, to love and to 
honour that genius and ability which have 
eclipsed his own. — ^Nor will he retire in 
disgust from the race, because he has been 
outstripped by others, but will redouble all 
his exertions in the service of mankind; re- 
collecting, that if nature has been more par- 
tial to others than to him in her intellectual 
gifts, she has left open to all the theatre of 
virtue ; where the merits of individuals are 
determined, not by their actual attainments, 
but by the use and improvement they make 
of those advantages which their situation 
has afforded them. 
8-i. Candour in judging of the intentions 
of others is a disposition of still greater im- 
portance. — It is highly probable that there 
is much less vice, or criminal intention, iii 
the world, than is commonly imagined; 
and that the greater part of the disputes 
among mankind arise from mutual mistake, 
or misapprehension. Every man must re- 
collect many instances in which his motives 
have been grossly misapprehended by the 
wor ld ; and it is reasonable for him to allow 
that the case may have been the same with 
other men. It is but an instance then of 
that justice we owe to others, to make the 
most candid allowances for tlieir apparent 
deviation, and to give every action the most 
favourable construction it can possibly ad- 
mit of. — Such a temper, while it tenders 
a man respectable and amiable in society, 
contributes perhaps more than any other 
circumstance to his private happiness. 
83. Candour, in controversy, implies a 
strong sense of justice united to. a sincere 
and disinterested love of truth. It is a dis- 
position of mind so difficult to preserve, 
and so rarely to be met with, that the most 
useful rule, perhaps, to be given with re- 
spect to it, is to avoid the occasions of dis- 
pute and opposition.-— A love of controversy 
indicates not only an overweening vanitj., 
and a disregard for truth, but in general, 
perhaps always, it indicates a mediocrity of 
genius ; for it arises from those feelings of 
envy and jealousy which provoke little 
minds to deprecate the merit of useful dis- 
coveries. He w’ho is conscious of his own 
inventive powers, and whose great object 
is to add to the stock of human knowledge, 
will reject unwillingly any plausible doc- 
trine till after the most severe examination ; 
and will separate with patience and temper 
the truth it contains from the errors that 
are blended with them. No opinion can 
be more groundless than that a captious 
and disputatious temper is a mark of acute- 
ness. On the contrary, a sound and manly 
understanding is, in no instance, more 
strongly displayed, than in a quick percep- 
tion of important truth when imperfectly 
stated and blended with error : a percep- 
tion which may not be sufficient to satisfy 
the judgment completely at the time, or 
at least to enable it to obviate the difficul- 
ties of others ; but which is sufficient to 
prevent it from a hasty rejection of the 
whole from the obvious defects of some ot 
the parts. — The effects of controversy on the 
temper, although abundantly sensible even 
in the solitude of the closet, are more pecu- 
liarly adverse to the discovery of truth nr 
those disputes which occur in convemation ; 
and wliich seldom answer any purpose, but 
