Section A. 
ASTRONOMY, MATHEMATICS, AND PHYSICS, 
ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT, 
ALEXANDER McAULAY, M.A. 
ON SOME POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF 
MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT. 
It is with feelings of reluctance akin to fear that I have ventured 
to accept the high honour of being the President of this Section and 
of framing this address. 
The choice of a subject has been the cause of no little hesitation, 
I do not feel competent to give a review of recent mathematical or 
physical work. The special branches of mathematics which I have 
most studied by no means lend themselves to treatment in a general 
address. At the risk, then, of being accused of throwing away energy 
on the killing of a very dead horse, I have decided to speak on a well- 
worn theme. What 1 have to say will probably appear to one class 
a string of platitudes, and to another to be tinged with hyperbole. 
In self-defence let me ask each class to remember that the other does 
exist. 
I read that among other objects of the Association are “to give 
a stronger impulse to scientific inquiry,’ ’ and “ to promote the inter- 
course of those who cultivate science, with one another.” I am bold 
enough, therefore, to attempt to appeal first to those whose scientific 
bent is not so pronounced as some other bent, and secondly to those 
who, while pursuing science, have little or no sympathy with what they 
regard as the dry pursuits of such as busy themselves with the so-called 
exact sciences. 
The pursuit of science has to-day grown to be quite a respectable, 
not to say a fashionable, occupation. Nobody scarcely nowadays is 
content without evidence. Would that the power of justly discrimi- 
nating the value of evidence were as universal as the craving for it. 
Many of the highest minds, perhaps the majority, share this public 
thirst for evidence. They teach that we must, not rest content with 
what we are told. We must not even believe our undisciplined senses. 
But after the listening and after the disciplining — especially the 
latter — we must trust to our educated instinct. 
But alongside the present-day popular kindly welcome of science, 
naturally is to be seen a corresponding reaction. “ Let us go back to 
first principles,” say some. “ How can we analyse the conflict of 
testimony ?” say others. “We believe this we believe that,” say all. 
There is, I believe, a growing disposition among a large mass of the 
unscientific to say — “ What is science after all? Have you not done 
