686 
PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 
within federation, which presents no special theoretical difficulty. 
The difficulty of what is known as Federation under the Crown arises 
from the conflict of two principles: the British -colonial dependency 
principle, which centralises all sovereignty in the Imperial Parliament, 
and the federal principle, which divides it between central and local 
governments. In order to determine how the two principles can best 
be reconciled in practice, it is necessary first to look at the exact 
nature of their conflict. 
Federalism, then, introduces a new conception of 'political sove- 
reignty — one which it is hard to square with the classical definitions. 
Its essence is the distribution of limited sovereign powers among 
central and local governments, and the clear delimitation of those 
powers in a Federal Constitution. In a supreme Federal Govern- 
ment, such as the United States, the powers and the limitations of 
the States and of the Union are to be gathered from the Federal 
Constitution alone — are matters of legal interpretation from the 
terms of the Constitution itself. 
The British-colonial system has points of likeness and points of 
difference. Colonial legislatures are also subordinate, but in a very 
different sense. Their limitations arc indeterminate, and cannot be 
defined bv any amount of legal interpretation. It is true that the 
Constitution Act of a British colony does define the outside limits 
of its legislative power — limits which the colonial legislature is power- 
less to exceed ; but this is without prejudice to the rights of the 
sovereign British Parliament, which can override colonial laws and 
constitutions at its pleasure. Besides, the Crown is an integral part 
of a colonial parliament, whose concurrence is needed in all legislation. 
The extent of colonial self-government cannot therefore be measured 
as a matter of law ; it rests upon the discretion of the Crown (that is, 
the British Government) and the Imperial Parliament. It cannot be 
ascertained by any rule what colonial laws the Queen will veto, or 
what laws of colonial application will be passed by the Imperial 
Parliament. 
Federation under the Crown necessarily involves a change of 
some sort in the colonial relations with the Crown. The Australian 
colonies at present are a group of States, practically self-governing, 
quite independent of each other, but each directly dependent on the 
Empire. In each the Crown is a component part of the legislature, 
and is represented by a Governor who plays the part of constitutional 
monarch of the colony, subject to a direct responsibility to the Imperial 
Government. Federation under the Crown means the creation of an 
intermediate government which, amongst its results, will pick up the 
threads binding the several colonies to the Empire and twist them into 
one. But if full effect is to be given to the federal principle, this 
intermediate government will not be a middle term in the series — 
j Empire, Commonwealth . , States. That is to say, the series will not he 
symmetrical ; the relation between the States and the Commonwealth 
will not be the same as that between the Commonwealth and the 
Empire. The Commonwealth will be a dependency of the Empire; 
but the States should in no sense be dependencies of the Common- 
wealth ; they should, in accordance with federal principle, be co- 
ordinate within their own sphere ; each State absolutely independent 
of the Commonwealth in matters that concern that State alone. 
