A PROBLEM! OF FEDERATION UNDER THE CROWN. 
687 
But federal principle also requires that British relations, which 
from an Australian point of view are external relations, should always 
be with the federated Commonwealth as a whole, not with the several 
States. What, then, is to become of the dependency of the States, if 
they must not be dependent either on the Commonwealth or directly 
on the Empire? And what room is left for State dependency when 
State government is confined to local matters alone, if each State is to 
have absolute control of its local concerns ? We are in a difficulty at 
once; the British principle and the federal principle conflict, and one 
or other must give way to a certain extent. 
It is, of course, obvious that the dependent relation is not a 
permanent one. The present compromise between dependency and 
independency is a historical accident, and is to a certain extent 
anomalous. We are dependent, yet self-governing; we are part of 
an Empire whose central Parliament occasionally legislates for us, but 
does not represent us and cannot tax us. It is a relation suitable to 
colonial infancy — suitable perhaps for many years to come, but one 
which in the nature of things cannot last for ever. Either one of 
two solutions may be ultimately possible : (1) Some form of so-called 
Imperial federation, which, with a federated Australia, would make 
the series symmetrical ; (2) Separation, which would cut the series 
up. But we have to look at things as they are. We are not ripe for 
either Imperial federation or separation; we are ripe for Australian 
federation ; and we must look for a system of federation under the 
Crown which, however imperfect according to strict political theory, 
will offer a modus vivendi. Given the series, Empire, Commonwealth , 
States, on what system can the functions of government be best 
distributed among the three with a due regard to federal principle 
and practical convenience, and without undue meddling with existing 
institutions ? 
As between the Empire and the Commonwealth the answer is 
simple enough. We have only to keep the familiar relation between 
the Empire and a self-governing colony. Canadian precedent proves 
the feasibility of this plan. The Governor- General occupies the same 
position with regard to the Federal Executive and to the British 
Crown as the ordinary colonial Governor under responsible govern- 
ment ; except that his instructions, corresponding with the importance 
of the dependency, give him — that is, his Executive — a freer hand. Of 
course the Canadian Constitution does not attempt to set a limit to 
the Imperial right of intervention in Dominion affairs. It empowers 
the Dominion Parliament to make laws lor the peace, order, and good 
government of Canada in relation to all matters not assigned by the 
Act exclusively to the Provincial legislatures; but it does not attempt 
to prohibit the intervention of the Imperial Parliament, nor to limit 
the Governor-GeneraPs — that is, the Crown’s — right of veto. Indeed, 
to have done so would hardly have been consistent with the dependency 
of the Dominion. 
It is unnecessary to discuss here the question whether the 
alternative proposition of an elective Governor- General would prove 
satisfactory. It is enough that, without trespassing on the realm of 
experiment at all, we can apply an institution which is ready to our 
hands. 
