688 
PROCEEDINGS OE SECTION G. 
It is with regard to the State Governments that the real difficulty 
arises. Here we shall find that the example of Canada is not such a 
safe precedent. The Canadian Constitution, in fact, attempts to make 
the series, Empire , Dominion , Provinces , symmetrical by introducing 
between Dominion and Provinces an element of dependency , The 
Lieutenant-Governor of a Canadian province is a federal officer, 
appointed and paid by the Dominion Government, and acting under 
instructions from the Dominion Executive. He is called the repre- 
sentative of the Queen, but he is only so at second-hand. He is a 
representative of “ The Govern or- General in Council,” of the 
Governor- General acting in the capacity of Chief Executive Officer of 
the Dominion, and therefore witli the advice of the Dominion Executive; 
not in the 'capacity of representative of the Queen, under Imperial 
instructions. The Lieu ter. ant-Governor is responsible for his acts to 
the Dominion Government. Under instructions from the Dominion 
Government he can vefo Acts of the Provincial legislature, or reserve 
them for the assent of the Governor-General — that is. in effect, of the 
Dominion Government. In short, the Provinces are to all intents 
and purposes made dependencies of the Dominion just as the Dominion 
is a dependency of the Empire. This is altogether opposed to the 
central principle of federalism, which is that State and I nion shall 
each he supreme within its own sphere, and which makes the courts, 
as interpreters of the Federal Constitution, the only arbiters between 
the laws of the State and the Union. The grievance is not merely an 
imaginary one ; the Dominion power of veto, though not frequently 
used, has been used occasionally when the interest of the Dominion 
conflicted with the interests of a province, and its use has invariably 
provoked irritation, sometimes almost a revolution. I he whole 
position of the Lieutenant-Governor is based upon a false analogy, 
and it is safe to say that Canadian experience warns us against that 
solution of the problem. 
Now let us turn to the “ Draft Bill to Constitute the Common- 
wealtli of Australia,” which is (if we except the embryo South African 
Act) the only other example of a Constitution embodying federation 
under the Crown. It altogether avoids the Canadian error. It leaves 
the State Governments and State legislation, within the sphere limited 
by the Constitution, altogether free from the control of the Common- 
wealth Government. It recognises the federal principle that the 
State should be co-ordinate with, not dependent on, the Union. But, 
on the other hand, it does not seem sufficiently to recognise the other 
federal principle that the bond with the Empire should be through 
the Commonwealth only, and not through the separate States. It 
leaves the several Governors direct representatives of the Queen, and 
directly responsible to her. It does indeed provide (Cli. A .,s. 5) that 
all communications between the Governor of a State and the Queen 
shall be made through the Governor-General ; hut this is a matter ot 
official procedure omy, not of federal principle. It also provides (s. 8) 
that “ the Parliament of a State may make such provisions as it thinks 
fit as to the manner of appointment of the Governor of the State, and 
for his tenure of office, and for his removal from office. Still this 
does not alter the fact that the State Governor, however appointed, 
would be responsible directly to the Queen, and that each State would 
deal dii ectly with the Empire as at present. The seven threads might 
