690 
PROCEEDINGS OE SECTION G. 
itself — the residuum of sovereignty resting indeterminately in the 
Dominion and the Empire. The Constitution, therefore, affords an 
absolute test of the validity or invalidity of a provincial law ; and even 
in the absence of a veto from outside, the provincial legislature could 
not attempt to overstep the limits of domestic legislation. It might 
safely have been declared in the Canadian Constitution that within the 
limits of the Constitution the provinces were sovereign States. 
In Australia, however, the opposite system of distribution of 
powers finds favour, and is adopted by the Commonwealth Bill, 
following the precedent of the United States, it is proposed to define 
strictly the powers of the Federal Government, leaving those of the 
States undefined. This would be a difference rather of method than 
of principle, if the Constitution dealt with the sum total of political 
sovereignty. But the Commonwealth Bill does not deal with the sum 
total of sovereignty; it defines the powers of State and Federal 
Parliaments inter sc, but leaves both m direct and indefinite contact 
with the Imperial Government. The Bill itself does not form an 
absolute test of the validity of a State law. Ch. Y. s. 1, provides that 
“ all powers which at the date of the establishment of the Commonwealth 
are vested in the Parliaments of the several colonies , and which are 
not by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliaments of the several 
States, are reserved to and shall remain vested in the Parliaments of 
the States respectively.” And as the Bill stands, the clause in italics, 
requiring reference to the pre-existing powers of the State Parlia- 
ment, is necessary. The Constitution, though conclusive as between 
the States and the Commonwealth, is silent as between the 
States and the Empire. Many matters which are not assigned to 
the Commonwealth are assuredly not left to the States ; as, for 
instance, the distinctly Imperial questions of treaties, the declaration 
of peace and war, and so forth. The difficulty is this : YY here the 
British-colonial relation of dependency exists, the line drawn between 
the powers allowed to the dependency and the powers retained by the 
Empire must be indeterminate. Jn Canada (it we omit the Dominion 
control over provincial laws) the provincial powers are exactly defined, 
and the indeterminate line is drawn only between the Empire and the 
Dominion, which are in direct contact with one another. Jn the 
Commonwealth Bill, the powers of the Commonwealth and the States 
are clearly defined inter se , but they are both left indeterminate as 
regards the Empire. 
This distinction, however, does not affect the principle for which 
I contend, though it may affect the manner of enforcing that principle. 
It must, of course, be admitted that it is impossible, short of Imperial 
federation, to draw a determinate line between the powers of the Empire 
and those of the Commonwealth. But I see no impossibility in defining 
the limits between Imperial and State concerns. The two are separated 
by so broad a belt that it ought not to be difficult to distinguish them, 
and to draft a clause which would definitely withdraw, or rather with- 
hold, from the State Parliaments all powers of a distinctly Imperial 
nature. It would then be possible to strike out the italicised part ot 
the clause quoted above, and to leave the Constitution the absolute 
test of the validity of State laws; which would do away with the 
necessity of an unfederal interference with State Government. ? as 
