A PROBLEM OE FEDERATION UNDER THE CROWN. 
G91 
I do not anticipate, such a clause cannot be satisfactorily drafted, the 
conclusion must be forced ou us that, for the peculiar circumstances 
of Federation under the Crown, the Canadian mode of definition is 
preferable to the American. This, of course, does not mean that the 
State powers need be as limited as in Canada ; the question is one, not 
of the extent of State rights, but of the mode of their definition. By 
a sufficiently careful and comprehensive enumeration, the powers 
assigned to the Canadian provinces might have been made as large as 
those reserved to the American States. This may be illustrated by 
the converse case of Switzerland, where the National powers, though 
strictly defined as in America, are for the most part fully as extensive 
as the Dominion powers in Canada. 
The whole position may he shortly summed up thus : — In every 
Federal Government the legislatures, central and local, are subordinate. 
In a “Supreme Federal Government,” such as the United States, 
they are subordinate only to the Constitution — the Constitution is the 
sole test of their powers and their limitations. Again, in a British 
colony the legislature is likewise subordinate ; subordinate in the first 
place to its own Constitution Act, to a definite extent, which is matter 
for legal determination ; subordinate in the second place to the 
Crown, to an extent that is altogether indefinite. In the case of 
British colonies federated under the Crown, both kinds of subordina- 
tion must occur. Federal and State legislatures must of course be 
subordinate to the Federal Constitution — else there were no Federa- 
tion. The Federal legislature must also he subordinate to the 
Crown — in other words, the Crown must be represented in that 
legislature — else there were no dependency. But the State legis- 
latures need not be subordinate to the Crown — the Crown need not be 
represented in them at all. From a federal point of view such 
representation would obviously bo out of place; from a British point 
of view it is unnecessary, as shown by 1:he precedent of Canada. Add 
to this that the double representation of the Queen would unnecessarily 
complicate our federal institutions. Superfluous machinery is always 
better out of the way ; and State politics are likely to work more 
smoothly if Australian Vice-royalty is concentrated in the Governor- 
General, and the State legislatures are freed from all restrictions 
except those which can he gathered from the Constitution itself. In 
short, political principle and practical expediency seem to point to 
the same conclusion : that in a Federation under the Crown the 
representation of the Queen in the State legislatures is both 
unnecessary and impolitic ; that the Governor- General is the only 
necessary, and indeed the only proper, representative of Imperial 
interests ; and that the State Governments should be limited by the 
Federal Constitution alone, and not subject to outside interference 
from Commonwealth or Empire. 
It does not come within the scope of this paper to discuss what 
form the State Executive would assume in the absence of a Governor 
appointed by and responsible to the Crown; but it may be pointed 
out that no very revolutionary change in our institutions is necessarily 
involved ; no change, indeed, except one which in any case must come 
sooner or later. Of course, if our Governors are no longer appointed 
for us we must either appoint them ourselves or do without them. 
The suggestions (1) to elect the Governor; (2) to work the Cabinet 
