(94 
PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 
to the Privy Council. But need there be (as there is in Canada) an 
appeal to the Privy Council (1) from the Federal Supreme Court 
acting as a Court of Appeal from the States or (2) direct from the State 
Supreme Courts themselves ? Both are questions which expediency 
rather than principle must decide. Either kind of appeal is technically 
opposed to State rights, and the first is further objectionable on the 
ground of multiplicity of appeals. The distance of the Privy Council 
is another drawback. But, of course, there are arguments on the other 
side ; and the right of appeal would, even if existing, be strictly limited 
by rules and practice. 
The constitutional importance of the appeal question arises in 
connection with the incidental duties of the courts as interpreters of 
the Constitution. The Federal Constitution of Australia will probably 
(unlike the Canadian Constitution) contain provisions for its own 
amendment by the people of Australia. Though in form an Imperial 
Act of Parliament, it will be handed to us to do what we like with; 
and we may rest assured that when once handed to us it would never 
again be meddled with by the British Parliament except at our express 
request. Made by Australia, amendable by Australia, ought it not 
also to be interpreted by Australia, and interpreted (at least as 
between the Commonwealth and the States) by Australia alone? In 
the United States the court which interprets the Constitution is a 
creature of the Constitution. The Constitution is self-sufficing in the 
matter of interpretation as of everything else. In a federation under 
the Crown the rights of the Crown must, of course, be subject to 
interpretation by the Crown itself — that is, by an Imperial court. But 
the Crow n is not concerned with the adjustment of rights between the 
Commonwealth and the States. Those rights depend upon the Federal 
Constitution; and the interpretation of a Constitution is equivalent to 
the text— the interpreters of laws are in a sense and to a certain 
extent makers of laws. Shall we feel that our Constitution is altogether 
our own if its final interpretation rest with a tribunal that is outside 
Australia? Principle here seems to assert itself, and to be backed up 
by serious risk of friction if its claims be not recognised. It might 
with advantage be provided that the decision of the Federal Supreme 
Court should be final iu interpretation, as between Commonwealth and 
States, of the Federal Constitution. 
In this paper it has only been possible to deal in general outlines. 
I have assumed that Federation under the Crown, though an artificial 
form of government brought about by historical accidents, is yet 
peculiarly adapted to the present circumstances of some of the groups 
of British-colonial States ; and I have tried to show that though such 
a Federation involves two conflicting principles — those, namely, of 
dependency and federalism — these principles may in practice be fairly 
w r ell reconciled w ithout undue sacrifice of either. I have tried to show 
that this can best be done by giving the federal principle free play 
between the Commonwealth and the States, and by giving the depen- 
dency principle free play between the Empire and the Commomvealth. 
At the same time I have not insisted upon a pedantic adherence to any 
political theory in the face of plain political expediency. Federalism 
and dependency are both expedient for us, and my object has been to 
employ these two principles not as fetishes, but as guides, and to look 
for the most practical means of combining them. My conclusion is 
