EXISTENCE. 
ing the idea he has of it in his memory ; 
and therefore he hath certain knowledge 
that they are not botli memory or fancy. 
Thirdly, add to this, that many ideas are 
produced in us with pain, which we after- 
wards remember without the least offence : 
thus, the pain of heat or cold, when the 
idea of it is revived in our minds, give us 
no disturbance, which, when felt, was very 
troublesome ; and we remember the pain 
of hunger, thirst, head-ach, &c. without 
any pain at all, which would either never 
disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often 
as we thought of it, were there no more but 
ideas floating in our minds, and appearances 
entertaining our fancies, without the real 
existence of things affecting us from abroad. 
Fourthly, our senses, in many cases, bear 
witness to the truth of each others report 
concerning the existence of sensible things 
without us : he that doubts when he sees a 
fire, whether it be real, may, if he pleases, 
feel it too, and by the exquisite pain may 
be convinced that it is not a bare idea, or 
phantom.” 
Dr. Berkeley, on the other hand, contends 
that external bodies have no existence but 
in the mind perceiving them, or that they 
exist no longer than they are perceived : 
his principal arguments, which several 
others, as well as himself, esteem a demon- 
stration of this system, are as follow : “ That 
neither our thoughts, passions, or ideas 
formed by the imagination, exist without 
the mind is allowed ; and that the various 
sensations impressed on the mind, whatever 
objects they compose, cannot exist otherwise 
than in a mind perceiving them, is equally 
evident. Tliis appears from the meaning of 
the term exist, when applied to sensible 
things : thus, the table I write on exists, 
i. e. I see and feel it ; and were I out of 
my study I should say it existed, i. e. that 
were I in my study I should see and feel 
it as before. There was an odour, i.e. I 
smelt it, &c; but the existence of unthink- 
ing beings without any relation to their be- 
ing perceived is unintelligible : their esse is 
percipi." Then to shew that the notion of 
bodies is grounded on the doctrine of ab- 
stract ideas, “ What,” he asks,“ are light and 
colours, heat and cold, extension and figure, 
in a word, the things we see and feel, but 
so many sensations, notions, ideas, or im- 
pressions on the sense ; and is it possible to 
separate, even in thought, any of these 
from perception ? The several bodies then 
that compose the frame of the world have 
not any subsistence without a mind : their 
esse is to be perceived or known; and if 
they are not perceived by me, nor by any 
other thinking being, they have no shadow 
of existence at all : the things we perceive 
are colour, figure, motion, &c. that is, the 
ideas of those things ; but has an idea any 
existence out of the mind? To have au 
idea is the same thing as to perceive ; 
that, therefore, wherein colour, figure, &c. 
exist, must perceive them. It is evident, 
therefore, that there can be no unthinking 
substance, or substratum of those ideas; 
But you may argue, if the ideas themselves 
do not exist without the mind, there may 
be things like them, whereof they are copies 
or resemblances, which exist without the 
mind. It is answered, an idea can be like 
nothing but an idea, a colour or figure can 
be nothing else but another colour or figure. 
It may be farther asked, whether those sup- 
posed original or external things, whereof 
our ideas are the pictures, be themselves 
perceivable or not ? If they be not, I appeal 
to any one whether it be sense to say a 
colour is like somewhat which is invisible, 
hard or soft, like somewhat untangible, &c. 
Some distinguish between primary and 
secondary qualities, the former, viz. exten- 
sion, solidity, figure, motion, rest, and num- 
ber, have a real existence out of the mind ; 
for the latter, under which come all other 
sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, 
& c. they allow the ideas we have of them 
are not resemblances of any thing without 
the mind, or unperceived, but depend on 
the size, texture, motion, &c. of the minute 
particles of matter. Now it is certain that 
those primary qualities are inseparably unit- 
ed with the other secondary ones, and cannot 
even in thought be abstracted from them, 
and therefore must only exist in the mind. 
Again, great or small, swift or slow, are 
allowed to exist no where without the 
mind, being merely relative, and changing 
as the frame or position of the organ 
changes : the extension, therefore, that 
exists without the mind is neither great nor 
small, the motion neither swift nor slow, 
i.e. they are nothing. That number is a 
creature of the mind is plain, (even though 
the other qualities were allowed to exist) 
from this, that the same thing bears a dif- 
ferent denomination of number as the mind 
views it with different respects ; thus, the 
same extension is 1, 3, or 36, as the mind 
considers it, with reference to a yard, a 
foot, or an inch. 
“ In effect, after the same manner, as the 
modern philosophers prove colours, tastes 
